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ABSTRACT 
In the present paper, a sketch is offered of a possible resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict with a special view to how the European Union might help bring this about. 
Consideration is also given to the larger framework of a lasting peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbours.  
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A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
THE CONTOURS OF A POST-CONFLICT PEACE ORDER 
BJØRN MØLLER 
1  Brief Historical Background 
The conflict between Jews and Palestinians is one of those “intractable conflicts” that have 
long troubled students of conflict resolution.
1 It goes back centuries, or even millennia, to the 
era of the Old Testament.
2 
1.1  The Conflict 
After the end of Ottoman rule in the aftermath of WWI, the UK assumed control of Palestine 
on a mandate from the League of Nations. With the Balfour Declaration the Brits committed 
themselves to create in Palestine “a national home for the Jewish people” by allowing for an 
immigration from the Jewish diaspora. While this was, arguably, in conformity with the 
mandate, its Art. 6 which obliged the UK to “facilitate Jewish immigration” also stipulated 
that this should not be allowed to prejudice “the rights and position of other sections of the 
population”. The Jewish immigration did, however, produce an intense struggle between the 
immigrants and the indigenous Palestinian population.
3 
After the end of WWII, and in recognition of the unspeakable horrors of the Holocaust, the 
victors likewise committed themselves to providing the Jews with a homeland in Palestine, 
which led to the decision by the United Nations General Assembly (29 November 1947) to 
establish the State of  Israel. The original partition plan stipulated the establishment of two 
states on the territory of Palestine, with Jerusalem (Arab: Al-Quds) constituting a corpus 
separatum, and thus belonging to neither side.
4 The implementation of this plan was, 
however, pre-empted by the unilateral proclamation of the State of Israel by the Jewish 
Agency on the very same day the UK relinquished its mandate (14 May 1948). This was 
followed by an attack on Israel the following day by the neighbouring Arab states. Having 
been defeated in the ensuing war, Jordan and Egypt, respectively, incorporated parts of what 
should have been a Palestinian state, leaving the Palestinians stateless and creating a large 
Palestinian diaspora.  
                                                 
1 Kriesberg, Louis, Terrell A. Northrup & Stuart J. Thorson (eds.): Intractable Conflicts and Their Transfor-
mation (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989). 
2 See, for instance, Reich, Bernard (ed.): An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: 
Aldwych Press, 1996); Sela, Avraham (ed.): Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 
1999); Tessler, Mark: A History of the Israeli-Palestinean Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); 
Smith, Charles D.: Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 3
rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). On the 
more recent history see Sayigh, Yezid: Armed Struggle and the Search for State. The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
3 League of Nations: “Mandate for Palestine” (C.529.M.134.1922.VI), 12 August 1922, at http://domino.un.org/ 
unispal.nsf. See also the “Balfour Declaration” at www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/balfour.html. On the mandate years 
see also Uri Ben-Eliezer: The Making of Israeli Militarism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 19-
144; Creveld, Martin Van: The Sword and the Olive. A Critical Story of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: 
Public Affairs, 1998), pp. 5-62; Tessler: op. cit. (note 2), pp. 123-268.   
4 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181(II) “Future Government of Palestine” (29 November 1947) 
at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf.  B JØRN MØLLER 
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Most of the Palestinian refugees were scattered among various Arab states (see Table 1). The 
Palestinian diaspora since then has grown to an estimated total of 3.8 million in 2001,
5 mainly 
through births (making today’s refugee population quite young, see Table 1). Additional 
refugees have also been created after the June War of 1967, when Israel occupied both the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem (conquered from Jordan) and the Gaza Strip, conquered from 
Egypt. To this mass of refugees has subsequently been added a large number of refugees and 
internally displaced persons as a consequence of the Israeli settlement drive on the occupied 
territories.
6  Even though the refugees’ right of return has been underlined by the UN ever 
since December 1948,
7 the actual prospects thereof seem increasingly dim. 
 
Table 1. Palestinian Refugees
a/ 
UNRWA List  Total In camps    Age distribution (2000)  Geographical distribution (2000) 
1953  870,158 300,785    < 6  481,873   Total In Camps
1955 912,425 351,532    6-15  881,945 Jordan  1,570,192 280,191
1960 1,136,487 409,223    16-25  708,856 West  Bank  583,009 157,676
1965 1,300,117 508,042    26-35 572,536 Gaza  824,622 451,186
1970 1,445,022 500,985    36-45  377,224 Lebanon  376,472 210,715
1975 1,652,436 551,643    46-55  263,620 Syria  383,199 111,712
1980  1,863,162 613,149    > 55  451,440 Total (UNRWA)  3,737,494 1,211,480
1985 2,119,862 805,482    Total    3,737,494 UNHCR List  (2001)
b/ 
1990 2,466,516 697,709    Iraq  90,000 
1995 3,246,044 1,007,375    Libya  8,584
2000 3,737,494 1,211,480   
Grand Total  
(2001) 
3.8 million   Saudi Arabia  240,000
a/ Figures from UNRWA www.un.org/unrwa/pr/pdf/figures.pdf. 
b/ Figures from UNHCR at www.unhcr.ch/statistics/hcr2001prov.zip. 
 
The Palestinian question has remained “on the agenda”, both in the United Nations and in the 
rhetoric of the Arab states,
8 yet without any clear recognition of the nationhood of the 
                                                 
5 Estimate by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) from 
www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/p1.htm. 
6 On the Israeli settlement policy, see e.g. Tessler, Mark & Ann Mosley Lesch: “Israel's Drive into the West Bank 
and Gaza”, in Ann Mosley Lesch & Mark Tessler (eds.): Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians. From Camp David to 
Intifada (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 194-222; Efrat, Elisha: “Jewish Settlements in the West 
Bank: Past, Present, and Future”, in Efraim Karsh (ed.): Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel 
(London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 135-148. See also Bar-Tal, Daniel, Dan Jacobsen & Tali Freund: “Security 
Feelings among Jewish Settlers in the Occupied Territories: A Study of Communal and Personal Antecedents”, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 39, no. 2 (June 1995), pp. 353-377. For an update see the “Settlement Monitor”, 
published by the Journal of Palestine Studies in each issue. 
7 Art. 11 in the UN General Assembly’s resolution 194.III (11 December 1948), at www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/ 
docs/A_RES_194.htm. On the refugee question see also Peretz, Don: Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle 
East Peace Process (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1993), passim; and the website of 
the UNRWA at www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/index.html. On the right of return see Mazzawi, Musa: Palestine and 
the Law. Guidelines for the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997), pp. 172-197; 
Alpher, Joseph & Khalil Shikaki: The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return (Cambridge, MA: 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998). 
8 For a list of UN resolutions see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/resolutions_new_qpal.htm On the 
attitude of the Arab states see Sela, Avraham: The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and 
the Quest for Regional Order (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997) and Barnett, Michael N.: 
Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), both 
of whom describe Arab politics as increasingly dominated by states acting on the basis of normal raison d’état, 
dismissing as increasingly empty rhetoric the pan-Arabist ideology that would mandate support for the 
Palestinian cause. See also Tibi, Basam: “From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign Arab States: A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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Palestinians (see below) or their right to a national state. In desperation, the PLO in 1988 
proclaimed a “State of Palestine”, but it was only accorded diplomatic recognition by rather 
insignificant states – even though Jordan had by then renouced all territorial claims on the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
The Palestinians have employed a panoply of means in their struggle for redemption, ranging 
from political and diplomatic activities to terrorism, the latter mainly directed against Israeli 
targets, both at home and abroad, and initially mainly featuring air hijackings and the like.
9 
They have further resorted to more regular guerrilla warfare and “almost regular” warfare 
waged by the Hizbullah from the Palestinian-controlled parts of Lebanon.
10 In 1987, the 
Palestinian struggle erupted in the first Intifada, which featured mainly unarmed resistance,
11 
whereas the second Intifada has been much more violent, including suicide atacks against 
Israeli civilians (see below). 
1.2  The Peace Process 
A peace process was launched in 1992 by PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Labour leaders 
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, initially operating via the “Oslo channel”.
12 It produced 
some fairly significant results in the first couple of years.
13 
The initial stages of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process were accompanied by an 
unmistakable thawing of relations between Israel and the Arab states. A peace treaty was thus 
signed by Israel with Jordan in 1994 to supplement the one signed with Egypt in 1979, and 
negotiations were started with the rest of the Arab community of states on a number of issues 
in a complex set of interlocking bilateral and multilateral talks.
14 
                                                                                                                                                          
Redefining the Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War”, in Michael C. Hudson (ed.): 
Middle East Dilemma. The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), pp. 92-106. 
9 See, for instance, Lustick, Ian S.: “Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences”, in Martha 
Crenshaw (ed.): Terrorism in Context  (University Park, PA: Pensylvania State University Press, 2001), pp. 514-
552; Karmon, Ely: “Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints”, MERIA 
Journal, vol. 4, no. 1 (March 2000), at http://meria.idc.ic-il/journal/ 2000/issue1/jv4n1a7.html. 
10 See the list of the equipment of Hizbullah, including artillery rockets, armoured personnel carriers, etc., in 
Feldman, Shai & Yiftah Shapir (eds.): The Middle East Military Balance 2002-2001 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001), p. 212. On the threat to Israel see ibid., pp. 43-46. For an update see Kurtz, Anat: “Hizbullah at the 
Crossroads”, Strategic Assessment, vol.  30, no. 1 (June 2000) at www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n1p5.html;  Zisser, 
Eyal: “Hizbullah Attacks: Motives and Implications”, Tel Aviv Notes, no. 30 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 2002).. 
11 McDowall, David: Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Lockman, 
Zachary & Jopel Beinin (eds.): Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (London:  I.B. Tauris, 
1990); Hunter, F. Robert: The Palestinian Uprising. A War by other Means (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1991); Tessler:  op.cit. (note 2), pp. 677-752; Smith: op. cit. (note 2),  pp. 291-308; Sayigh: op. cit. (note 2), 
pp. 607-638; Robinson, Glenn E.: Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), pp. 132-173 
12 Corbin, Jane: The Norway Channel. The Secret Talks that Led to the Middle East Peace Accord (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Makovsky, David: Making Peace With the PLO. The Rabin Government's Road to 
the Oslo Accords (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
13 Good overviews of the process are Joffe, Lawrence: Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process. 1
st ed. 
(London: Cartermill, 1996); and the chapters in the consecutive SIPRI Yearbooks from 1992 to 2002. 
14 A good overview is Peters, Joel: Pathways to Peace. The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs/European Commission, 1996); Steinberg, Gerald M.: “Middle East Arms 
Control and Regional Security”, Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 126-141; Kimche, David: “The Arab-
Israeli Peace Process”, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 135-148; Khouri, Rami G.: “The Arab- B JØRN MØLLER 
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As far as relations between Israel and the Palestinians were concerned,
15 the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) signed the 13
th of September 1993 clearly stipulated the following 
objectives: 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian 
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
16 
The UN Security Council resolution 242 referred to was, in its turn, somewhat more 
equivocal than usually acknowledged by either side, allowing both to see it as at least a partial 
vindication of their respective points of view. On the one hand, it called for “withdrawal of 
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, yet without specifying 
whether this referred to all or merely some of the occupied territories (viz. the missing 
preposition). On the other hand, it also called for “respect for and acknowledgement of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area” (i.e. 
also that of Israel) and for “a just settlement of the refugee problem”, without offering any 
explicit formula for “justice” in this respect.  
One of the most significant implications of the DOP was that the two sides mutually 
recognised each other as legitimate interlocutors, as manifested by the symbolic handshake on 
the White House lawn. The DOP was, furthermore, followed by a gradual, albeit slow and 
frequently interrupted, transfer of powers from Israel to the new Palestine National Authority 
(PNA, also known as Palestinian Authority, PA). As an appetiser for a more grandiose “Land 
for Peace” bargain, a gradual and partial Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory was 
initiated with the Cairo Agreement (4 May 1994) which  subdivided the territories into zones: 
“A zones” where the PA was in control, and B and C zones where control was shared.
17 
                                                                                                                                                          
Israeli Peace Process: Lessons from the Five Years since Oslo”, ibid., vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 333-
344. On the peace treaty with Egypt see Quandt, William B.: Peace Process. American Diplomacy and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); on that with Jordan see Lukacs, 
Yehuda:  Israel, Jordan and the Peace Process, 2
nd edition (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999); 
Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain & Neil Caplan: Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace. Patterns, Problems, Possibilities 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 90-102 on the negotiation, and pp. 217-228 on the 
treaty. On the negotiations with Syria see Cobban, Helena: The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks. 1991-96 and Beyond 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Rabinovich, Itamar: The Brink of Peace. The 
Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Slater, Jerome: “Lost Opportunities 
for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001”, International Security, vol. 27, no. 1 
(Summer 2002), pp. 79-106. 
15 King, John: Handshake in Washington. The Beginning of Middle East Peace (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1994); 
Giacama, George & Dar Jørund Lønning (eds.): After Oslo. New Realities, Old Problems (London: Pluto Press, 
1998). 
16 In Eisenberg & Caplan: op. cit. (note 16), pp.  212-216. 
17 The Cairo Agreement is reprinted in the SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 203-210; and the Washington Agreement of 
28 September 1995 in the SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 191-202. See also  Jones,. Peter: “The Middle East Peace 
Process”, ibid. pp. 161-189 with a map of the zones on p. 170. On the (il)legal status of the “territories” see 
Korman, Sharon: The Right of Conquest. The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 250-267 & passim. On Israeli attitudes see Lehman, Pedi: “Land for Peace. 
On the Inner-Israeli Controversy over Peace in the Middle East”, Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 47, no. 2 (2
nd 
Quarter 1996), pp. 165-174.   A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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As a corollary of this process, a debate commenced in Israel about the wisdom and ethics of 
the continuing – and equally illegal
18 – settlement drive on the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
While a continuation of settlements remained government policy,
19 a growing number of 
Israelis at least began to question it.
20 Moreover, many Israelis gradually began to come to 
terms with the notion of Palestinian statehood at some point in the future.
21 
The final achievement of the DOP was a time-table for further steps, leading up to the so-
called “permanent status negotiations”, on which the DOP clearly stipulated that: 
Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later 
than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian people’s representatives. It is 
understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. 
With the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, however, the process became stalled and 
was subsequently obstructed by Israel, to some extent even rolled back. The 1998 Wye 
Agreement, brought about with the help of the United States, was thus merely a modest 
compromise to ensure the implementation, in a truncated form, of what had already been 
agreed to. The agreed-upon transfer of thirteen percent of the West Bank to the PA was thus a 
far cry from what had been envisioned in Oslo, Washington and Cairo.
22  
However, even the implementation of the Wye accords was subsequently suspended until 
after the Israeli elections in July 1999 which brought the Labour Party to power with Ehud 
Barak as Prime Minister. Despite some apparently sincere efforts by Barak at getting the 
peace process back on track, e.g. with some major concessions to the goal of Palestinian 
statehood, it was probably “too little, too late” to satisfy Palestinian demands. In the last 
rounds of negotiations at Sharm-el-Shaik (September 1999), in Washington and Ramallah 
(March-May 2000), at Camp David (July 2000), again in Washington (December 2000), and 
finally at Taba (January 2001), Israel reportedly offered the PA 66 percent (perhaps even up 
to 90 percent) of the West Bank territory, but this offer was turned down by the Palestinians – 
apparently mainly because of insufficient Israeli concessions with regard Jerusalem.
23   
                                                 
18 On the (il)legal status of settlements, see art. 49 of the Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilians in 
Times of War (1949) which clearly states that “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own 
population into the territory it occupies”. See Falk, Richard: “World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process in 
the Middle East”, in Elise Boulding (ed.): Building Peace in the Middle East. Challenges for States and Civil 
Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 189-196 (quote from p. 196). See also McCoubrey, H. & N.D. 
White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992),  pp. 279-294. 
19 On post-Oslo settlement policies see Jong, Jan de: “The Geography of Politics: Israel's Settlement Drive after 
Oslo”, in Giacama & Lønning (eds.): op. cit. (note 17), pp. 77-120. On the settlements in Jerusalem see Aronsen, 
Geoffrey: “Israeli Settlements in and around Jerusalem” in Ghada Karmi (ed.): Jerusalem Today. What Future for 
the Peace Process? (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp. 75-82. 
20 On Israeli attitudes to the settlement policy see Arian, Asher: Security Threatened. Surveying Israeli Opinion on 
Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 154-155, 251-252; and for an update idem: 
“Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002”, Memorandum, no. 61 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, July 2002), p. 27. On Israeli opposition to the settlements see Bar-On, Mordechai: In Pursuit of Peace. A 
History of the Israeli Peace Movement (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), passim. 
21 Arian: op. cit. 1995 (note 22), p. 98; idem: op. cit. 2002 (note 22), p. 33. 
22 The Wye River Memorandum is available at www.israel-mfa.giv.il/peace/wye.html. 
23 Lalor, Paul: “Annex 2C: The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process in 2002”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001, pp. 162-173. 
See also Pundak, Ron: “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?”, Survival, vol. 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp.  B JØRN MØLLER 
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1.3  The Al Aqsa Intifada 
A second intifada erupted when on the 28
th of September 2000 Netanyahu’s successor at 
leader of the Likud party, Ariel Sharon, went for “a stroll” on the Temple Mount (Haram al-
Sharif). He thereby (probably intentionally) provoked Palestinian riots,
24 which effectively 
burried the last hopes for the peace process, in turn paving the way for his own election as 
prime minister of Israel in February 2001.  As a consequence what began as sporadic riots 
developed into a second general uprising, the al-Aqsa Intifada.
25 It has exhibited the following 
features: 
•  Widespread and apparently planned and almost systematic Palestinian terrorism, now 
mostly in the form of suicide bombs detonated in the midst of the civilian Israeli 
population, and assassinations of Israeli politicians such as the minister of information. 
•  A paradoxical combination of, on the one hand, increased legitimacy to the PA leadership, 
especially President Arafat (mainly in a role as “martyr”) with, on the other hand, an 
erosion of its actual authority and control, much of which has devolved to groups such as 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
26 
As was to be expected, the Israelis responded to the Intifada with the utmost severity, e.g. by 
the following measures: 
•  Reprisals, not only in the form of raids against presumed terrorist strongholds, but also of 
direct attacks against the PA institutions and facilities under the auspices of “Operation 
Defensive Shield” followed by “Operation Determined Path”. 
•  Air attacks against presumed terrorist homes, most dramatically with the F-16 attack 
against Salah Shehada, the leader of the Hamas military wing Izz a-Din el-Kassam on the 
22
nd of July 2002, which also killed sixteen civilians, including eleven children.
27 
                                                                                                                                                          
31-45; Makovsky. David: “Middle East Peace Through Partition”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2 (March/April 
2001), pp. 28-45. Interesting insider’s accounts by the chief US negotiator are Roth, Dennis: “Yasir Arafat”, 
Foreign Policy, no. 131 (July/August 2002), pp. 18-26; and idem: “From Oslo to Camp David to Taba: Setting 
the Record Straight”, PeaceWatch (Washington Institute for Near Eastern Studies), no. 340 (14 August 2001). 
The contents of the positions at Taba are recorded in a “non-paper” by the EU’s special representative to the 
Middle East peace process, Miguel Angel Moratinos. See “The Moratinos Nonpaper on the Taba negotiations”, 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 31, no. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 81-89.  
24 It was expressis verbis called  a provocation by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1322 of 7 October 
2000, at www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1322e.pdf. 
25 Hammami, Rema & Salim Tamari: “Anatomy of Another Rebellion”, Middle East Report, no. 217 (Winter 
2000), at  www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_hammami-tamari.html; idem & idem: “The Second Uprising: End or 
Beginning?”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 5-25; Bishara, Azmi: “Reflections 
on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel”, ibid., no. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 54-67; 
Rannani, Mouin: “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion”, ibid., pp. 68-81. 
26 Martin, Leonore: “Arafat’s Dueling Dilemmas: Succession and the Peace Process”, MERIA Journal, vol. 6, no. 1 
(March 2002), at http://meria.idc.ic-il/journal/ 2002/issue1/jv6n1a5.html; Rubin, Barry: “The Future of Palestinian 
Politics: Factions, Frictions, and Functions”, ibid., vol. 4, no. 3 (September 2000), at  http://meria.idc.ic-il/journal/ 
2000/issue3/jv4n3a7.html; idem: “The Terror and the Pity: Yasit Arafat and the Second Loss of Palestine”, ibid., 
vol. 6, no. 1 (March 2002) at http://meria.idc.ic-il/journal/2002/issue1/jv6n1a6.html; Hammani. Rema: “Inter-
regnum. Palestine after Operation Defensive Shield”, Middle East Report, no. 223 (Summer 2002 at 
www.merip.org/mer/mer223/223_hammami.html; Inbari, Pinhas: “Who Can Control the West Bank?”, Middle 
East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3, at www.meib.org/articles/0103_ip1.htm.  On Hamas and suicide attacks see 
Juergensmeyer, Mark: Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 2
nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2000), pp. 69-78. 
27 Benn, Aluf & Amos Harel: “IDF, Shin Bet to probe Gaza bombing disaster”, Ha’aretz, English Edition, 24 
July 2002. On the Palestnian plans for a ceasefire which were thwarted by the attack see Alon, Gideon: “Ramon A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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•  A policy of a closure of Israel’s borders with Palestinian territories as well as of a 
blocking of communications between Gaza and the West Bank and within the two 
territories. 
•  First steps towards a unilateral partition in the shape of a fence or wall along (parts of) the 
“green line”, i.e. the pre-1967 border – but in places perhaps located on occupied 
ground.
28 
•  A policy of reoccupation of towns and lands, not only in zones labelled B and C in the 
Cairo and subsequent agreements, but also in “A zones”, defined as falling under 
exclusive Palestinian control – in some cases accompanied by the use of severe military 
force, e.g. in the Jenin camp.
29 
•  Plans for deportation to the Gaza Strip of family members of suspected terrorists and 
demolition of their houses.
30 
Most of these measures have been met with more or less open protest from other states, in 
some cases even including the United States, yet without any significant effect. 
2  The Impasse of Incrementalism 
Even though an incrementalist approach to the conflict might appear most “realistic”, simply 
because it is most moderate, several factors speak against it at the present juncture.
31 
2.1  The Logic of War 
At the time of writing (October 2002), the parties seemed trapped in the “logic of war” with 
an in-built escalatory momentum. Underlying this chain of events there are, of course, more 
structural factors – including the “structural violence” to which the Palestinians are subjected 
on a daily basis.
32 Once set in motion, however, the violent cycle takes on a life of its own.
33  
                                                                                                                                                          
unveils Tanzim initiative for ceasefire”, ibid., 30 July 2002.  See also “Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres on CNN Late Edition, July 28, 2002”, at www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0m560, in which he 
described the attack as “a mistake”.  
28 Brom, Shlomo & Yiftah S. Shapir: “Erecting a Separation Fence”, Tel Aviv Notes, no. 42 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee 
Center for Strategic Studies, 27 June 2002). For a critique see Bashkin, Gershon: The New Walls and Fences—
Consequences for Israel and Palestine, Paper for the CEPS/Eliamep Middle East Seminar, Halki, 8-11 
September 2002. 
29 See the Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10, 
(Document A/ES-10/186), at www.un.org/peace/jenin/.  
30 Verter Yossi: “U.S., Annan slam plan to deport terrorists' families”, Ha’aretz. English Edition, 21 July 2002; 
Segal, Ze'ev: “Analysis. The legality of demolition”, ibid., Ha'aretz Staff: “Few of terrorists'  kin will be sent to 
Gaza”, ibid On 6 August 2002, the High Court in Israel condoned the demolitions. See the press release by 
Amnesty International: “Israel/OT: High Court Decision Gives Green Light for Collective Punishment”, at 
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/MDE151272002. 
31 See, for instance. Agha, Hussein & Robert Malley: “The Last Negotiation. How to End the Middle East Peace 
Process”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 10-18.  
32 On structural violence see Galtung, Johan: “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, in idem: Peace: Research, 
Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume I  (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975), pp. 
109-134; Weigert, Kathleen Maas: “Structural Violence”, in Lester Kurtz & Jennifer Turpin (eds.): Encyclopedia 
of Violence, Peace, and Conflict (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1999), vol. 3, pp. 431-440. 
33 Kriesberg, Louis: Constructive Conflicts. From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1998), pp. 151-180; Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse: Contemporary Conflict Resolution: 
The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 15-
19; Wallensteen, Peter: Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System (London: Sage, 
2002), pp. 34-39.  B JØRN MØLLER 
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•  Some Palestinians respond to Israeli occupation and oppression with terrorist attacks (or 
what is referred to as such), including suicide bombings – by Israel labelled “homicide 
bombings”. 
•  This triggers a semi-automatic Israeli response in the form of a closure of (part of) the 
territories and/or a re-occupation followed by a hunt for the (alleged or actual) terrorists, 
which inevitably causes “collateral damage” in the form of civilian casualties, destroyed 
property and, perhaps even more importantly, a weakening of the Palestinian authorities. 
•  The Palestinians feel victimised and excluded and some of them respond with further 
violence – with or without the knowledge and consent of the PA, but apparently with a 
significant backing in the population. 
•  This, in turn, reinforces the Israeli enemy image of the Palestinians as inherently violent 
and of the PA (not least President Arafat) as impotent or malevolent (or both) – thereby 
“justifying” an escalation of oppression and a deliberate bypassing of the PA. 
•  This in turn, reinforces Palestinian enemy images of Israel in general, and the Sharon 
government in particular, as malevolent, thereby creating swelling the ranks of would-be 
suicide terrorists, etc.   
It is extremely difficult to break such a vicious circle, as any concession to the respective 
other could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. It may be even more difficult when neither 
side is a unitary actor, but both leaderships have oppositions to contend with. The several 
(both unilateral and negotiated cease-fires) that have all been broken clearly testify to this 
difficulty. Not even the United States has been able to persuade Israel to show moderation
34 – 
even though it, for the first time ever, allowed the UN Security Council to pass a resolution 
charging Israel with the “excessive use of force against Palestinians”.
35 
Fig. 1: Israeli and Palestinian Casualties
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By the beginning of July 2002, the number of Israeli fatalities since the 20
th of September 
2000 amounted to 563, according to Israeli government sources,
36 while the death toll among 
                                                 
34 See, for instance, “Bush Sends Powell to Middle East on peace mission. Calls on Israelis to end incursions; 
Arab world to confront terrorism” (4 April 2002), at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/text/ 
0404bush.htm  The US president further said that “to lay the foundations of future peace, I ask Israel to halt 
incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas and begin the withdrawal from those cities it has recently occupied,” 
adding that “Consistent with the Mitchell Plan, Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop”. 
35 UN Security Council Resolution 1322 (7 October 2000), at www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1322e.pdf. 
36 “Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000”, at www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/ 
go.asp?MFAH0ia50. A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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Palestinians was around three times that number, i.e. 1,639 deaths, according to the 
Palestinian Red Crescent Society.
37 Still, there was no end to the killings in sight. The non-
linear, but still clearly discernible, escalatory momentum is obvious from Figure 1 and Table 
2, showing the fortnightly casualty figures for the two sides. 
Table 2. Israeli and Palestinian Casualties (by fortnight beginning) 
a/ 
  Israelis Palestinians Total Israelis Palestinians Total
29.09.00 7 73  80 01.09.01  7  31 38
16.10.00 4 45  49 16.09.01  3  31 34
01.11.00 13 61  74 01.10.01  5  22 27
16.11.00 9 49  58 16.10..01 7  61 68
01.12.00 3 34  37 01.11.01  6  14 20
16.12.00 5 17  22 16.11.01  8  22 30
01.01.01 1 12  13 01.12.01  36  51 87
16.01.01 5 6  11 16.12.01  0  18 18
01.02.01 12 1  13 01.01.02  7  5 12
16.02.01 0 9  9 16.01.02  9  24 33
01.03.01 4 12  16 01.02.02  11  22 33
16.03.01 4 14  18 16.01.02  19  59 78
01.04.01 3 12  15 01.03.02  53  181 234
16.04.01 4 12  16 16.03.02  58  60 118
01.05.01 5 22  27 01.04.02  47  81 128
16.05.01 12 23  35 16.04.02  6  52 58
01.06.01 18 9  27 01.05.02  18  26 44
16.06.01 9 7  16 16.05.02  12  18 30
01.07.01 9 14  23 01.06.02  24  25 49
16.07.01 2 18  20    
01.08.01 16 10  26 Total 491 1,288 1,779
16.08.01 10 25  35 Average/month 12.0 31.4 43.4
a/ Figures from Middle East Policy Council: Conflict Statistics, based on data from the Israeli MFA, B’tselem 
(Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) and the Palestinian Red Crescent 
Society available at www.mepc.org/public/resources/mrates.shtml.  
 
2.2  Rationality or Madness? 
“Rational choice theory” seems able to provide a largely satisfactory explanation of this 
mutual killing spree.
38 
For the sake of simplicity one might narrow down the options of each side to three, i.e. giving 
in (e.g. by de-escalating or yielding), continue fighting (e.g. in a “tit-for-tat” mode) and 
escalating, as depicted in Table 3 below.
 If we further assume that the side prevails who 
enjoys “escalation dominance”, we get the following picture of the options facing each side.  
                                                 
37 www.palestinercs.org/crisistables/table_of_figures.htm 
38 The following section is inspired by Nicholson, Michael E.: Formal Theories in International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); idem: Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 63-103; Rapoport, Anatol:  The Origins of Violence. 
Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon Hourse, 1989), pp. 286-309; Schelling, Thomas: The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridg, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), passim; Brams, Steven & D. Marc 
Kilgour: Game Theory and National Security (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 1-15; Axelrod, Robert: The 
Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); idem: The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-Based 
Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).    B JØRN MØLLER 
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•  If the Palestinians give in, but the Israelis do not, they stand to lose—either slowly, if 
Israel just continues its war of attrition, or swiftly, if Israel escalates by launching a 
decisive strike against them. Only if they can be sure that the Israelis will reciprocate by, 
likewise, yielding will it thus make sense for the Palestinians to do so. 
•  Conversely, if the Israelis give in, but the Palestinians do not, they stand to lose—albeit in 
any case slowly as the Palestinians have no chance of launching any decisive strike 
against them. In any case the choice is all too easy.  Only in the case of certainty that the 
Palestinians will also yield will it be strategically rational for the Israelis to do so. 
 
Table 3. Israeli and Palestinian Strategic Moves 
Israel 
 
Palestinians  
Give In  Continue Fighting  Escalate 
Give In   +1/+1 
Compromise 
-2/+2 
Israeli Victory (Slow) 
-2/+2 
Israeli Victory (Swift) 
Continue 
Fighting 
+1,-1 
Pal. Victory (Slow) 
-1,-1 
Stalemate 
-2/+2 
Israeli Victory (Swift) 
Escalate  +2/-2 
Pal. Victory (Slow) 
+2/-2 
Pal. Victory (Slow) 
-2/-2 
Escalation 
 
The problem lies with the structure of the conflict (i.e. the “game”) itself rather than with the 
actors. Even though the likely outcome is the worst one for both sides, they are likely to arrive 
at it, not because of irrationality, but precisely because they are assumed to act rationally, i.e. 
cautiously and selfishly, which is surely not an unreasonable assumption. The pay-off 
structure is simply a recipe for continuing and escalating violent conflict. 
In principle various outcomes of the conflict are possible as set out in Table 4.  It is 
conceivable that either side could win a decisive victory over the other which would produce 
a situation significantly better than when the conflict (or the present round of it) began, in 
which case the “payoffs” would be +2 for the victor and –2 for the vanquished. However, this 
is unlikely, albeit perhaps to different degrees. 
 
Table 4. Possible Outcomes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict  
Israel 
 
Palestinians  
Victory Stalemate  Defeat 
Victory  +1/+1 
Perhaps conceivable  n.a.  -2/+2 
Very unlikely 
Stalemate  n.a.  0/0  or -1/-1 
Very  likely  n.a. 
Defeat 
 
+2/-2 
Unlikely  n.a.  -2/-2 
Likely 
 
•  It is conceivable that Israel might prevail in the present round by bringing the al-Aqsa 
Intifada to a halt, but it seems almost certain that it would then eventually flare up again. 
Hence a decisive (and, by implication, lasting) victory is unlikely. 
•  It is very unlikely that the Palestinians could defeat Israel decisively, say by achieving 
their former goal of destroying the Jewish state, if only because of Israel’s military 
preponderance. Just like guerrilla’s wars in the past, the hit-and-run tactics of the A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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guerrillas (or suicide bombers) may be able to stave off defeat, but it cannot bring about 
victory, which requires an offensive by conventional means.
39 
It is, alas, entirely conceivable that both sides may reap defeat (payoff -2/-2) from the 
struggle, say if the aforementioned logic of violence or war takes over completely, thus 
making the lives of ordinary Israelis just as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” as the 
present one of the Palestinian population.
40  
Even though the prospects of victory might make it tempting to try, neither side thus has any 
realistic chance of winning a decisive victory. The Palestinians stand no chance of becoming 
preponderant in the foreseeable future, for several reasons: 
•  They are presently dispersed in their diaspora (see above), hence weakened, and Israel is 
in a position to regulate their return to replete the ranks of the Palestinian resistance – and 
it is almost certain to become less and less forthcoming in this respects the more intense 
the struggle becomes.
41 
•  They lack access to most of those implements of power that statehood provides; and their 
statelike structures are likely to become increasingly dismantled and/or emasculated the 
more they join forces with the resistance rather than help containing it.  
•  Their prospects of international support are very limited, except for rhetoric, and likely to 
shrink further the more they resort to violent (and especially terrorist) means of struggle.  
None of the above is likely to change in the short or medium term, and any major change 
presupposes Israeli acquiescence. 
The Israelis might, at first glance, appear to stand a better chance. However, they are 
numerically inferior to the total Arab population in and around Israel and bound to become 
increasingly so because of higher Arab (including Palestinian) birth rates (see below). The 
danger of becoming a minority even in their own homeland looms large in the Israeli minds.
42 
Another reason why Israeli unilateralism is not really an option is that it will inevitably find 
itself enwrapped in an asymmetrical struggle. While the Palestinian struggle during the first 
Intifada consisted mainly of non-violent resistance, the predominant mode of fighting in the 
second one has been terrorism.
43 Against both forms of struggle, however, Israel’s military 
superiority is of no avail, and the use of the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) to combat insurgents 
is likely to have a damaging effect on morale. While the impact on morale may be somewhat 
lesser in the second than in the first Intifada because of the use of violent means by the 
Palestinians, the casualty toll in IDF ranks is, on the other hand, higher, which will tend to be 
equally detrimental to morale.
 44 
                                                 
39 On guerilla strategy see Laqueur, Walter (ed.): The Guerilla Reader. A Historical Anthology (London: 
Wildwood House, 1978); Chaliand, Gérard (ed.): Guerilla Strategies. An Historical Anthology from the Long 
March to Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
40 The expression is from Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186. 
41 Peretz: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 11-17. 
42 Arian: op. cit. 1995 (note 22), pp. 209-230. 
43 On asymmetrical warfare see Luttwak, Edward N.: Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987); Arreguín-Toft, Ivan: “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Asymmetric 
Conflict”, International Security, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93-128. See also Luft, Gal: “The Palestinian 
H-Bomb. Terror’s Winning Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 2-7. 
44 Creveld: op. cit. (note 3), p. 352. See also Liebes, Tamar & Shoshana Blum-Kulka: “Managing a Moral 
Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada”, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 21, no. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 45-68; Barzilai,  B JØRN MØLLER 
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Israel’s counter-insurgency strategy has further featured a closure of the “territories”, as 
happened several times during the first Palestinian uprising and has happened repeatedly 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada. However, not only does this also negatively affect the Israeli 
economy, but there are absolutely no signs that the Palestinians can be “starved into 
submission” – even though malnutrition and related health problems are spreading rapidly 
among the Palestinians as a result of the closures and other Israeli security measures.
 45  On 
the contrary, attempts at this simply tend to strengthen the extremists, including Hamas, 
thereby exacerbating rather than solving the problem.  
2.3  From Stalemate to a “Moment of Ripeness”? 
A stalemate thus seems the most likely outcome, where both sides can stave off defeat, but 
neither can actually win. Stalemates, however, come in different versions, including some that 
are quite tolerable, at least for one side, but perhaps even for both (payoffs ranging from 0 to 
–1 in all combinations). According to conflict theory for a stalemate to produce a sufficiently 
strong desire for peace and conflict resolution to make a difference, it has to be intolerable, 
i.e. a “hurting stalemate” representing “a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future”, as 
described by William Zartmann.
46 
Unless broken, such a hurting stalemate will become almost indistinguishable from mutual 
defeat. By implication, it may present a “moment of ripeness” for the resolution of a conflict, 
as it gives each side a strong incentive to look for alternatives. In some cases, some dramatic 
event may make a conflict that formerly seemed tolerable appear utterly intolerable, thereby 
almost instantaneously creating a ripe moment – as seems to have happened in Northern 
Ireland in 1998.
47 However, even though one might conceive of, say, one particularly 
destructive suicide bomb going off in Israel somehow generating an “enough is enough” 
sentiment, violence is usually a poor underpinning of peace efforts.  
Should the ripe moment arrive and be exploited, it is at least conceivable that a solution could 
be found which would allow both sides to feel that they had won (values +1/+1), at least in 
the sense of being better off with a resolution of the conflict than with its continuance – which 
is indeed a precondtion of a lasting peace. Even less than ideal solutions may thus come to 
appear in a favourable light because of the unattractive present and the horrendous prospects 
for the future. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Gad & Efraim Inbar: “The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options”, ibid., vol. 23, no. 1 (Fall 
1996), pp. 49-80. 
45 On the near starvation of many Palestinians see the report from USAID: “Preliminary Findings of the Nutritional 
Assessment and Sentinel Surveillance System for West Bank and Gaza” (5 August 2002), at www.usaid.gov/wbg/ 
nutritional_report.pdf. On the general situation see, for instance, Roy, Sara: The Gaza Strip. The Political Economy 
of De-Development (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 291-308; Robinson: op. cit. (note 13), pp. 132-173. 
46 Zartman, I William: Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa. 2
nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 268; idem: “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts”, in idem 
(ed.): Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 
3-29. See also Kriesberg: op. cit. (note 35), pp. 194-195; Miall et al.: op. cit. (note 35), pp. 162-163; Wallensteen: 
op. cit. (note 35), pp. 43-45. 
47 Darby. John: The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2001), pp.  96-100; Weiss, Ruth: Peace in Their Time. War and Peace in Ireland and Southern Africa 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 202-204.   A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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3  Plans for the “Final Status” 
There is thus an urgent need for “light at the end of the tunnel” in the form of at least a vision 
of the final peace, preferably a genuine blueprint. 
Rather than seeking to bring about peace through incremental steps, truce agreements, etc. 
which are anyhow unlikely to be abided by, and which would in any cases be seen as “too 
little too late”, it is now important to go straight to the “end-game”, as has convincingly been 
argued by the International Crisis Group in a recent set of reports.
48 Should agreement on the 
final status be reached, incremental steps may then be seen in a more favourable light, i.e. as 
“steps towards the goal”.  
What may warrant some optimism, even in violent and troubled times such as these, about the 
prospects for agreement on the final status is the fact that the principled positions of both the 
two parties and other relevant players are actually much less far apart than they were until 
quite recently.  
3.1  Israel’s Position(s) 
Whereas the Labour governments of Rabin and Barak became openly supportive of a two-
state solution, neither the successive Likud-led governments of Netanyahu and Sharon have 
been favourably inclined towards Palestinian statehood as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, 
even the Sharon coalition government seems to be ruling out fewer possibilities than the 
Likud would have done in the past. In his address to the Knesset on the 14
th of May 2002 the 
Prime Minister declared as follows: 
(...) Israel wants to enter into peace negotiations and will do so as soon as two 
basic terms for the establishment of a genuine peace process are met:  
•  The complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement.  
•  The Palestinian Authority must undergo basic structural reforms in all areas (...) 
When these two basic terms are met, we will be able to enter into a settlement in 
stages, including a lengthy intermediate stage in which relations between us and 
the Palestinians will be determined. Afterwards, after we see how the Palestinians 
build their society and self-governing administration, after we are convinced that 
they desire a true peace—then we will be able to advance towards discussions on 
determining the character of the permanent settlement between us and them.
49 
This “plan” was announced on the eve of a decision by the Likud central committee (13 May 
2002) to the effect that “no Palestinian state will be established west of the Jordan River” – a 
decision which Sharon expressis verbis refused to accept as binding.
50 
The Labour Party remains committed to a two-state solution of sorts, even though its hands 
are presently tied by their membership of the Sharon coalition government. Prominent 
members of the Labour Party such as Foreign Minister (and Deputy Prime Minister) Peres 
                                                 
48 International Crisis Group (ICG) “Middle East Endgame”: I: “Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace 
Settlement”, Middle East Report, no. 2 (Amman/Washington/Brussels: ICG); II: “How a Comprehensive Israeli 
Peace Settlement Would Look”, ibid., no. 3; and III: “Israel, Syria and Lebanon—How Comprehensive Peace 
Settlements Would Look”, ibid., no. 4. 
49 At www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0lpk0 
50 “Sharon and Peres Reject Likud Vote against Palestinian State”, Israel Line, 13 May 2002. On Sharon’s 
leadership style and the fragile coalition see Benn, Aluf: “The Last of the Patriarchs”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, 
no. 3  (May/June 2002), pp. 64-78.   B JØRN MØLLER 
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have, moreover, embedded this commitment in more grandiose visions of an interdependent 
and collaborative regional system.
51  Other members of the Labour Party, such as Defence 
Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, have come forward with almost fully-fledged peace plans, 
which foresee the establishment of a Palestinian state on “almost all” of the West Bank and 
Gaza, an equitable “land swap” and a de facto division of Jerusalem with the exception of the 
Old City, envisioned to fall under international sovereignty. 
52 
3.2  The Palestinian Position(s) 
On the 3
rd of February 2002, PA leader Yasir Arafat published in the New York Times a 
“Palestinian Vision of Peace”, in which he upheld the claim for “an independent and viable 
Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967”, the “sharing of all Jerusalem as 
one open city and as the capital of two states”, as well as “a fair and just solution to the plight 
of Palestinian refugees ” that would “respect Israel’s demographic concerns”.
 53 
The PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department provides the following summary of Palestinian 
Positions with regard to the final settlement. 
Borders: (...) the international borders between the States of Palestine and Israel 
shall be the armistice cease-fire lines in effect on June 4, 1967. Both states shall 
be entitled to live in peace and security within these recognised borders. (...) 
Statehood: By virtue of their right to self-determination, the Palestinian people 
possess sovereignty over the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza 
Strip and, accordingly, have the right to establish an independent State on that 
territory.  
Jerusalem: (...) East Jerusalem is (...) part of the territory over which the 
Palestinian state shall exercise sovereignty upon its establishment. The State of 
Palestine shall declare Jerusalem as its capital. 
Jerusalem should be an open city. Within Jerusalem, irrespective of the resolution 
of the question of sovereignty, there should be no physical partition that would 
prevent the free circulation of persons within it. As to sites of religious 
significance, most of that are located within the Old City in East Jerusalem, 
Palestine shall be committed to guaranteeing freedom of worship and access 
there. Palestine will take all possible measures to protect such sites and preserve 
their dignity.  
Settlements: Settlements are illegal and must be dismantled. (...)  
Refugees: Every Palestinian refugee has the right to return to his or her home. 
Every Palestinian refugee also has the right to compensation for their losses 
arising from their dispossession and displacement. (...) 
Relations with Neighbours: The State of Palestine as a sovereign state has the 
right independently to define and conduct its foreign relations. The PLO will 
nevertheless seek to promote cooperation among Israel, Palestine, and 
neighboring States in fields of common interest. (...)
54 
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On the 12
th of June 2002, a “non-paper” was delivered by the PA to US Secretary of State 
Powell which included a number of new concessions, such as a Palestinian willingness to 
undertake “minor, reciprocal and equal boundary rectifications”, grant Israel sovereignty over 
those parts of East Jerusalem which have special religious significance and a partial 
accommodation of Israel’s demographic concerns through the stipulation that a solution to the 
refugee problem should be agreed to, signalling a willingness to compromise. The PA, finally, 
underlined its preparedness to end the conflict on this basis, thereby renouncing its right to 
come up with any additional new demands at a later stage.
55 
Both sides are thus significantly closer to each other than they were in the not so distant past. 
3.3  The International Setting  
The possible exploitation of a ripe moment may be facilitated or hampered by the 
international setting of the conflict. 
As the world of today is different from what is was during the Cold War, this setting actually 
seems quite propitious. The Cold War logic of “our enemy’s friends are our enemies, his 
enemy’s enemies are our friends” no longer applies, but has been replaced by an 
unprecedented international consensus on most issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. One manifestation thereof is the “Quartet”, comprising the United States, the EU, 
Russia and the United Nations who are (at least ostensibly) collaborating with regard to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of rather similar principled positions. All of them 
support an end to violence and a resumption of the peace process, the end goal of which 
should be a two-state solution of sorts. In their joint statement of 10 April 2002, the Quartet 
thus stated: 
(...) We reaffirm our support for the objective (...) of two States, Israel and 
Palestine, living side-by-side within secure and recognised borders. (...) We 
affirm that the Tenet and Mitchell plans must be fully implemented, including an 
end to all settlement activity. We affirm that there must be immediate, parallel 
and accelerated movement towards near-term and tangible political progress, and 
that there must be a defined series of steps leading to permanent peace – 
involving recognition, normalisation and security between the sides, an end to 
Israeli occupation, and an end to the conflict.
56    
At their meeting on the 16
th of July 2002, the Quartet paid some tribute to the “Bush Plan” 
(see below) while sticking to the same basic principles:  
(...) The UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for the goal of achieving 
a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement which, with intensive effort on security and 
reform by all, could be reached within three years from now. The UN, EU and 
Russia welcome President Bush’s commitment to active U.S. leadership toward 
that goal. The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two 
states, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by 
side in peace and security (...) 
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In line with the “visions” of President Bush, the Quartet further underlined the need for 
security sector reform in the Palestine yet to be:
57 
Implementation of an action plan, with appropriate benchmarks for progress on 
reform measures, should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian 
state characterised by the rule of law, separation of powers, and a vibrant free 
market economy that can best serve the interests of its people. (...) The Quartet 
agreed on the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security 
capabilities on sound bases of unified command, and transparency and 
accountability with regard to resources and conduct.
58 
Having been the organisation to decide on the establishment of the State of Israel (i.e. on the 
partition of the former British mandate territory of Palestine) the United Nations has all along 
had a special role to play in the conflict. However, its central formal role has not been 
underpinned by the requisite support from its members – not least the permanent members of 
the Security Council, vested with a special responsibility – for it to play an actual role 
commensurate with its formal importance. 
In the light of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the United Nations has expressed support for the two-state 
solution, e.g. in Security Council resolution 1397 (12 March 2002) referring to “a vision of a 
region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised 
borders”
59 
Based on the “Crownprince Abdullah Plan”, the Council of the League of Arab States at 
the Summit Level at its 14
th Ordinary Session in Beirut (28 March 2002) passed a resolution 
stipulating the following.  
... [The Council] calls upon Israel to affirm: ... 
•  Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the 
Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining 
occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon. 
•  Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed 
upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194. 
•  The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian 
State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm the following: 
•  Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with 
Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. 
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•  Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
 
60  
From the Arab League has emerged an informal “trio” comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, each having a special role to play with regard to the peace process.  
While the United States was fairly committed to the peace process during the Clinton 
administration (yet without achieving any results or committing itself to supporting any 
particular final status formula),
61 the coincidence of the al-Aqsa Intifada with the 11
th of 
September events, the change of administration and the new administration’s commitment to 
a war against Iraq all left Washington in a difficult situation, which was almost tantamount to 
paralysis. 
•  Having declared a global “war on terrorism”
62 it has been controversial for the US 
administration to even talk to persons such as Arafat, accused by Israel and the American 
right wing of being a terrorist leader – and equally controversial to criticise the Sharon 
government for its campaign against Palestinian terrorism, cleverly framed by the former 
as a contribution to the US war.  
•  The determination to “go for Saddam” as part of the alleged “Axis of Evil”
63 (even in the 
absence of any obvious casus belli) will make it very hard to forge the alliance with Arab 
states that would be a precondition for a successful war against terrorism.
64 The almost 
inevitable impression of being anti-Arab or even anti-Muslim will make it even harder for 
the United States to play any role as “honest broker” in the Israeli-Arab or Israeli-
Palestinian conflicts. 
The Mitchell Report was published on the 30
th of April 2001,
65 and still remains an important 
point of reference with its recommendations for a halt to further Israeli settlements and a 
“cooling off periode” (i.e. a truce) followed by a resumption of negotiations. However, it had 
next to nothing to say about what might be the outcome of such talks.  
On the 24
th of June 2002, the Bush administration, finally, announced its position on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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(...) My vision is two states, living side by side in peace and security. (...) Peace 
requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can 
be born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not 
compromised by terror.  (...) And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, 
new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbours, the United 
States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders 
and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a 
final settlement in the Middle East. (...) The final borders, the capital and other 
aspects of this state’s sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties, as part 
of a final settlement. (...) I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the 
emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. As we make progress towards 
security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to 
September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell 
Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop. (...) 
Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them 
if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between 
them. This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended 
through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 
242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognise borders. We must 
also resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian 
refugees, and a final peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Syria 
that supports peace and fights terror. (...)
66 
This was a rather bizarre plan, in several respects. The very notion of a “provisional state” 
with equally provisional borders was an innovation, to put it mildly. And whereas most would 
share the hopes of President Bush for the outcome of forthcoming Palestinian elections. the 
more free and fair these will be the greater their unpredictability. Finally, the “plan” left 
almost all issues concerning the final settlement open. 
In its Declaration on the Middle East, passed by the meeting in Seville of the European 
Council on the 21
st and 22
nd of June 2002, the European Union made a few, rather vague, 
statements:  
The European Council supports the early convening of an international 
conference. That conference should address political and economic aspects as 
well as matters relating to security. It should confirm the parameters of the 
political solution and establish a realistic and well-defined time scale. (...) 
A settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation. 
The objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a 
democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 
1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end 
result should be two States living side by side within secure and recognised 
borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours. In this context, a fair 
solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable and 
agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.  
The reform of the Palestinian Authority is essential. The European Council 
expects the PA to make good its commitment to security reform, early elections 
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and political and administrative reform. The European Union reaffirms its 
willingness to continue to assist in these reforms.  
Military operations in the Occupied Territories must cease. Restrictions on 
freedom of movement must be lifted. Walls will not bring peace. 
67 
Even though these positions may seem quite far apart indeed, most of them have some 
elements in common. With the partial exception of Israel (or, more precisely, parts of the 
Likud Party) all agree that a Palestinian state should be established at some point in the future; 
and that an arrangement will have to be devised that allows the two states to co-exist with 
each other. 
There thus seems to be some foundations on which to build. One might, for instance, think of 
an informal “2+4+3” setting (i.e. Israel, Palestine, the Quartet and the Trio) for both 
negotiations and subsequent monitoring of any agreement, as suggested by the ICG—and in 
partial analogy with the “2+4” setting of the German settlement in 1990.
68  
4  Towards Co-Operative Security 
How a final status settlement might come to look is the topic of the remainder of this paper. 
As a premise for this, however, an identification of the main dilemmas is indispensable. 
4.1  The Security Dilemma  
One might describe the foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an instance of the 
well-known security dilemma, which according to neo-realist analysis affects relations in any 
anarchic setting. When two actors have come to regard each other as potential enemies, both 
of them tend to take steps for their own protection which (however inadvertently) make each 
of them appear threatening to the other side, who responds in a similar fashion. A vicious 
circle often results which may manifest itself in arms racing, pre-emptive strikes, preventive 
wars – or in a growing oppression that provokes rebellious action which may well become 
violent and nasty (e.g. by including suicide bombings),  “requiring” even more severe 
oppression, etc. Whereas “traditional” realist theory focused exclusively on states,
69 several 
modern neo-realists have attempted to apply security dilemma theory also to non-state actors 
and mixed settings where states confront other actors.
70 
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Ever since the birth of Israel in 1948 (or even before that) we have seen this security dilemma 
at work between the states in the region, manifesting itself in the wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967 
and 1973, as well as in the state of  “virtual war” which has prevailed for most of the 
interludes.
71 Even though peace agreements have been signed between Israel and Egypt 
(1979) and Jordan (1994), at least the former remains a distinctly “cold peace” which has, at 
best, mitigated but far from eliminated the security dilemma. Still, the main security dilemma 
facing Israel as of today is undoubtedly that inherent in its relations with the Palestinians. 
For most of the period, the Palestinians have been little more than “pawns” in this Arab-
Israeli conflict, to the interests of whom the Arab states have paid lip-service, but little more. 
Occasionally, the Arab states have even turned against the Palestinians, as when Egypt took 
over the Gaza Strip and Jordan occupied the West Bank in 1948, or when the latter launched 
the military campaign against the PLO fedayeen in (what the PLO refer to as) the “Black 
September” of 1970.
72 
Because of the animosity (to put it mildly) between Jews and Palestinians, one side is bound 
to feel insecure when the other dominates. The Palestinians are thus just as insecure under 
Israeli occupation as the Jews would be in a state dominated by Palestinians or other Arabs. 
The situation of an Israeli settlement on occupied territory is a microcosmic version of the 
same security dilemma. It represents an Israel enclave in an environment that is perceived as 
distinctly hostile – in fact uncomfortably similar to the situation of the Jewish ghettos in 
Europe and elsewhere in the past. Hence the need for an armed protection which is, in its turn, 
viewed as threatening by the Palestinians. When the latter resort to hostile acts against settlers 
or their armed guardians, this is usually viewed as an ex post facto validation of the need for 
the armed presence, or even used as an argument for strengthening it – whence may easily 
develop a vicious circle of escalating violence, as we have seen since September 2000. 
The security dilemma may also manifest itself in terms of such intangibles as “national 
identity”, i.e. as a “societal security dilemma”.
73 One might even argue that the very identities 
of Israelis and Palestinians are mutually incompatible, hence may provide sufficient grounds 
for conflict, even in the absence of conflicting interests. First of all, some would argue that 
“identity” presupposes “otherness” and that this Other is (automatically, or at least usually) 
seen as a hostile, rather than merely different, Other.
74 Secondly, to the extent that nationhood 
is based on attachment to a particular piece of land,
75 Palestinian and Israeli/Jewish identities 
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all too easily become mutually exclusive. The more politically (as opposed to religiously or 
culturally) Jewish the Israelis become, the less capable will they be of acknowledging another 
nation’s right to that land which is a constitutive element of (this form of) national identity. 
And the more the Palestinians see themselves as a nation in their own right (as opposed to 
merely one segment of a larger Arab nation), the more their identity will come to presuppose 
the possession of Palestine, including the present Israel.
76  
4.2  Stable Peace and Common Security 
The security dilemma is not easily resolvable, hence the predominant assumption is that it is 
perennial, leaving the parties with no viable alternative to unilateral power politics which may 
even go so far as territorial partition followed by “ethnic cleansing”.
77 Much preferable is 
surely an accommodation by each side of the respective other’s basic security and other 
needs. 
A transcendence of the security dilemma and a stable peace presuppose that all sides regard 
the resolution of the previous conflict as satisfactory.
78 A necessary, albeit not sufficient, 
precondition thereof is that both Israeli and Palestinian security concerns are met, for which 
the notion of “common security” seems to be the appropriate guideline.
79 This is not 
tantamount to unselfish behaviour, but entirely compatible with a pursuit of national interests, 
if only these are not “defined in terms of power”, but rather of security, and if a medium or 
long-term perspective is adopted.
80  
Even if we reject as illusory goals such as “absolute security”, we are still faced with a wide 
spectrum of goals and ambitions. According to constructivists a certain matter is not one of 
security, but the discourse may make it so, i.e. a topic may be “securitised” or “de-
securitised”, as aptly put by Ole Wæver. If a problem is securitised it is generally held to 
warrant “extraordinary measures” by virtue of its urgency and “existential” nature. However, 
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as nobody holds an uncontested monopoly on securitisation and de-securitisation, this will 
also be a matter of political controversy, where numerous vested interests can play a role.
81 
It is further contested to whom (or what) “security” can refer, i.e. what the term’s appropriate 
“referent object” is. Traditionalists want to reserve the term for the State’s security which is 
often misleadingly labelled “national security”, and sometimes used as a cover for what is 
really “regime security”, i.e. a particular group’s political domination. Others are prepared to 
extend it to (some) human collectives such as ethnies, nations or religious groups, even 
stateless ones. Still others insist that the ultimate referent object is the individual, regardless of 
political, ethnic or national affiliations.
82 
Finally, there is a controversy over what it means to be “secure”, i.e. the term’s connotation, 
as it obviously cannot mean the same when applied to a State, a stateless community and an 
individual. Only states can be sovereign and they alone have a territorial integrity to preserve, 
while only collectives have a collective identity that could conceivable be threatened, etc. 
Individual human beings, on the other hand, value both their survival and quality of life (See 
Table 5) 
 
Table 5. Concepts of Security 
Label  Focus  Value at risk  Source(s) of threat 
National security  The state  Sovereignty 
Territorial integrity 
Other states 
(Substate actors) 
Societal security  Nations 
Societal groups 
National unity 
Identity 
(States),  Nations, 
migrants, alien culture 
Human security  Individuals 
Mankind 
Survival 
Quality of life 
The State, globalisation, 
nature 
 
4.3  The Problem of Statehood 
A lot of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to revolve around the question of statehood, 
both about the existing Israeli state and the future one of Palestine. We therefore also need an 
analytical framework able to grasp the various problems related to statehood. 
A useful conceptualisation of the “dimensions” of the State is that developed by Barry Buzan 
and subsequently slightly amended by Kalevi Holsti (see Figure 2).
83 Both distinguish 
between the “idea”, the physical basis of the state and its institutions. Each of these can be 
further subdivided, which makes it possible to identify elements of state strength and 
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weakness and the various challenges facing the State, which may well be interlinked. For 
instance, if a state’s idea is that of being a nation-state, this idea is vulnerable to demographic 
developments; and if it is based on some kind of social contract (e.g. conceived as a welfare 
state), this idea may be jeopardised by a deterioration of the standard of human rights or by a 
crisis in the national economy which makes it impossible for the state to “deliver”. 
 
Fig. 2: Elements of Statehood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In almost all respects, both Israel and “Palestine” appear to be much more complicated than 
the “typical” European state – which may be partly due to their recent vintage. While the 
European states has centuries to arrive at fairly harmonious states (and an accompanying state 
system), state-building in the Middle East in general, and the former mandate territory of 
Palestine has merely had around half a century.
84   
In the following, I shall apply the above conceptualisations of security and statehood to a very 
tentative and sketchy analysis of Israeli and Palestinian security requirements in order to 
identify a meaningful set of minimum requirements. If these minima are compatible then a 
settlement based on the criteria of common security will, in principle, be achievable.
85  
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5  The Security Requirements of Israel 
Israeli security would have to encompass the absence of serious threat to both the State of 
Israel, the Jewish nation as such and the Israeli citizens.  
5.1  State Security 
As far as state security is concerned, both the idea, the physical basis and the institutions of 
Israel would need to be secure. Unfortunately, the three are not automatically compatible.  
As far as the territorial basis is concerned, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel 
within its internationally recognised borders has largely ceased to be a real problem, even 
though Israel has yet to acknowledge the fact. Thanks to Iraq’s defeat in 1991, the collapse of 
the USSR (i.e. the main supporter of Syria and Iraq), the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, 
and the budding alliance with Turkey,
86 the military Arab-Israeli balance of power has tilted 
tremendously in Israel’s favour. 
Even when measured against a hypothetical (and highly unlikely) “worst case alliance” 
comprising Syria, Jordan and an Iraq which had miraculously escaped UN sanctions Israel 
would be in a dramatically better situation than a decade ago – to say nothing about its 
nuclear weapons potential and de facto alliance with the United States.
87 Even a Palestinian 
state on the West Bank and Gaza in possession of armed forces would be unable to tilt this 
favourable balance of power. The former problem has simply been solved which has provided 
ample scope for “land for peace” deals as well as removed the need for the offensive military 
doctrines and strategies.
88  
The idea of the Israeli state is much more complicated, if only because there are competing 
notions of this idea. The original zionist idea was to merely create a national homeland for the 
persecuted Jews (i.e. a kind of “safe haven”), as was the predominant view of most of the 
founding fathers of Israel and remains prevalent within the Labour Party. 
While this idea of Israel is easily reconcilable with that of a Palestinian nation-state, it has all 
along been contested (mainly by the Likud) by another idea which is not, i.e. the notion of 
Eretz Israel. Even though it is couched in spatial terms, this is actually not so much a 
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territorial concept, as an integral part of a particular understanding of what it is to be an 
Israeli, namely to be a Jew and as such endowed with a God-given right to a Jewish state 
within borders defined by none other than God himself—and in actual fact including all of the 
occupied territories, Jordan and parts of Syria and Iraq.
89  
For those in favour of the God-given Jewish State, non-Jews are automatically viewed as 
“aliens” whose presence is only tolerated as a temporary solution. The fact that quite a large 
part of the settler population belongs to this creed, seeing their very presence in the occupied 
territories as the fulfillment of a divine duty, not only rules out their peaceful coexistence with 
the surrounding (Palestinian) society, but also renders inconceivable what would otherwise be 
an obvious solution, i.e. a separation of the two nations with the Jews within Israeli borders 
and the Palestinians repatriated in a Palestinian state.  
Even the very idea of a “Jewish state” may be problematic as it raises definitional questions 
about jewishness as well as concrete demographic problems. 
The demographic problems stem from the fact that Arab/Palestinian birth rates are simply 
higher than those of the Jews, as the latter beget, on average, 2.6 children per woman, but the 
former no less than 4.6.
90 Hence, the Jewish share of births is steadily declining (see Table 6). 
As a consequence the Jewish segment of the population will, at some stage, find itself 
outnumbered by Arabs – unless, of course, it is able to win the demographic “race” against 
the Palestinians via Jewish immigration and/or ethnic cleansing in the form of an expulsion of 
non-Jews from Israel. A hypothetical return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper would 
almost immediately reduce the Jews to a minority in Israel (see Table 7). 
 
 
Table 6. Israeli Demographics 
Live-Births by Religion of Mother Immigration De jure population (000) 
Year Jewish Moslem Ratio All Jews Non-Jews Ratio
1955  42,339 6,034 7.0 37,528 1,591 199 8.0
1960  44,981 8,130 5.5 24,692 1,911 239 8.0
1965  51,311 11,515 4.5 31,115 2,299 299 7.7
1970  61,209 16,130 3.8 36,750 2,582 440 5.9
1975  73,248 18,652 3.9 20,028 2,959 534 5.5
1980  71,372 19,031 3.8 20,428 3,283 639 5.1
1985  75,267 19,766 3.8 10,642 3,517 749 4.7
1990  73,851 24,515 3.0 199,516 3,947 875 4.5
1995  80,401 30,226 2.7 77,361 4,550 1,070 4.3
2000  91,936 35,740 2.6 60,192 5,181 1,189 4.4
  Source: Figures from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics at www.cbs.gov.il/engindex.htm. 
Table 7. Jews and Israelis  Jews Non-Jews 
Israeli Jews  Israelis 
Askenazi Sephardim 
Arab Israelis 
(Palestinian repratriates to Israel) 
Jewish Disapora  Non-Israelis 
Askernazi Sephardim 
(Palestinian repratriates to Palestine) 
Everybody else 
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An expansion of Jewish immigration, however, may require a relaxation of the criteria of 
jewishness, which are already quite permissive. The “Law of Return” from 1950 thus granted 
all Jews the right to come to Israel as “olehs” (Jewish immigrants). In 1970, it was amended 
to allow for the immigration with oleh status to children and grandchildren as well as their 
spouses, “Jew” being defined as anyone either born by a Jewish mother or converted to 
Judaism. These criteria have subsequently been further relaxed in order to accommodate 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union, only some of whom are “real Jews” and who are 
generally poorly integrated with the rest of the Jewish nation.
91 Apart from those, the most 
likely new immigrants will be oriental Jews (sephardim), which will exacerbate the combined 
social and ethnic cleavages in Israeli society and/or tip the balance against the ashkenazim.  
5.2  Societal Security 
This brings us directly to the question of societal security, i.e. the absence of threats to the 
identity and cohesion of the Jewish nation. This may already be a problem for Israel, as a 
large part of its immigrants are not Jewish; hence the risk of diluting the jewishness of Israel 
as well as a threatening the identity of the Jewish nation.
92  
Moreover, “Jewishness” may be defined in, at least, three different ways – in terms of 
religion, ethnicity or ancestry. Just as not all Israeli citizens are Jewish, not all Jews are 
religious Jews – and some of the very most orthodox religious Jews in Israel even refuse to 
acknowledge their citizenship on the grounds that the real Israel can only be founded by the 
Messiah himself. 
While the actual “founding fathers” of Israel in their quest for ensuring the secular nature of 
the Israeli state underlined Jewishness as an ethnic category, it is also controversial on what to 
base this ethnic identity as it is certainly not a reflection of any shared language (as is the case 
of most other self-proclaimed ethnic groups).
93 In fact Jiddish was closer to being “the Jewish 
language” than Hebrew, even though the latter is the historical language of the Jews and has 
been made the official language of Israel. It is also debatable to which extent Jews really share 
a common culture to provide a basis for ethnic identity, as the differences between the 
askhenazi (from Europe) and sephardim (from the Middle East) are considerable.  
The fact that Jewish identity is thus contested and fragile militates strongly, in at least some 
Israeli minds, against too close contact with the Palestinians as this might “dilute” their 
jewishness. Combined with the aforementioned demographic trends it also makes the 
prospects of a binational state even less attractive that they might otherwise have been.  
5.3  Human Security 
To national and societal security considerations should be added those of individual security. 
From this category one threat looms particularly large in the Israeli minds (and in government 
policy), namely personal security against terrorist attacks. Israel is indeed one of the world’s 
most terrorist-ridden countries in the world. Even though the actual number of victims may 
not be particularly alarming compared to other causes of death such as traffic accidents (not 
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even after the onset of the Al-Aqsa intifada) the psychological impact of suicide bombs 
detonated in the midst of the civilian population is immense, hence individual security is a 
problem which no Israeli politician can disregard with impunity.  
6  The Security Requirements of Palestine 
The Palestinians are a nation to the same extent as the Israelis. As such they must be 
acknowledged as endowed with the same rights to state, societal and individual security.
94  
6.1  State Security 
A Palestinian state is problematic, both with regard to its idea, physical basis and institutions. 
At first glance, the idea of the Palestinian state as a nation-state for the Palestinian nation may 
seem simple. However, Palestinian nationhood is no more self-evident than that of the Jews, 
as several factors militate against it.
95 
First of all, Palestine has never been a state as such, which might have given the Palestinian 
an “identity through continuity” as the rightful citizens (and rulers) of a state “under 
temporary Jewish occupation”. Secondly, for a long time the pan-Arabist notion of one Arab 
nation prevented the recognition by the Arab states of the Palestinians as a separate nation.  
What eventually paved the way for this recognition was the gradual decline of the pan-Arabic 
ideology (which does, however, continue to play a certain role as a “rhetorical frame” for 
Arab leaders)
 in favour of nation and state building.
96 It surely also helped that the Hashemite 
rulers of Jordan came to realise that they were better off with a small Jordan which they could 
control than with a larger one (including the West Bank) with a large Palestinian population 
who would most likely take over if granted Jordanian citizenship.
97 
Statehood presupposes (de jure) sovereignty in the formal sense of recognition as the supreme 
authority within a demarcated territory. Such sovereignty may be relinquished, either 
completely or in a piecemeal fashion (as EU member states do to the EU), but it cannot be 
achieved incrementally by a simple cumulation of powers and prerogatives as the gradual 
transfer of authority to the PA under the auspices of the peace process.
98 Either a polity is 
sovereign or not, and Palestine presently is not.  While it is easy to envision the Palestinians 
making such a heroic leap into sovereignty, e.g. by unilaterally proclaiming statehood, it 
strains the imagination to envisage Israel recognising this new state. In the absence of such 
recognition, most Western countries, above all the United States would probably withhold 
their diplomatic recognition. 
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Certain constraints on the subsequent exercise of sovereign powers may, however, help make 
Palestinian sovereignty more palatable to Israel, hence more likely to be achieved. Relevant 
constraints might include a Palestinian commitment to neutrality along with certain 
qualitative as well as quantitative limitations of the new state’s permitted armaments. For 
Palestine to commit herself to armed neutrality and to help prevent the use of the West Bank 
for an attack against Israel from Syria and its possible allies would make perfect sense. Not 
only would it help shield Israel, thereby “compensating” it for the loss of strategic depth 
entailed by a withdrawal from the West Bank. It would also provide the Palestinian state with 
a modicum of traditional state sovereignty. At the very least, it would surely be preferable to 
such an Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank in case of an impending war as has hitherto 
been planned for.
99 
As far as the physical basis of the state is concerned, the question of “actual (i.e. de facto) 
sovereignty” becomes important, i.e. the question how to maintain real control over the 
sovereign domain. Even though it is preferable to possess a contiguous territory, it is not an 
absolute sine qua non, as the world knows several examples of states which are or include 
enclaves (West Berlin in East Germany during the Cold War, or Lesotho in South Africa 
today) or exclaves (Alaska, for instance), or both. However, in view of the legacy of the 
recent intense hostility, it seems unlikely that a “patchwork” or “quilt state” would be 
satisfactory to the Palestinians, implying that means of linking the West Bank and Gaza have 
to be found. The claim for Jerusalem (i.e. Al-Quds) is of an altogether different nature. Even 
though it is formally a territorial claim, it has less to do with the physical basis of the State 
than with its idea because of its religious significance.
100  
6.2  Societal Security 
Palestinian societal security would seem to presuppose at least two minimum requirements: 
A right for the refugees to return from their diaspora; and equal religious, cultural, economic 
and social rights with the Israeli/Jewish population, unless the two nations are separated (see 
below). 
The Palestinian nation is not much more uniform or internally cohesive than that of the Jews. 
First of all, a large part of it constitutes a diaspora, scattered across the globe, albeit with the 
majority residing in Arab countries. For a long time, the entire leadership of the PLO was part 
of this diaspora. The remaining population was divided between citizens of Israel
101 and 
stateless inhabitants of the occupied territories – as the representative of whom Hamas rose to 
prominence, especially during the first Intifada. Both groups were further divided along both 
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political and religious lines, i.e. between the secular and Muslim Palestinians, in their turn 
subdivided into Sunni and Shi’a as well as “secularised” and fundamentalist believers.
102 
The modicum of “quasi-statehood” provided by the establishment of the PA may, in due 
course, provide the Palestinian nation with a new rallying point and identity as citizens of a 
state (as opposed to an ethnically or religiously defined identity), but the authority and actual 
performance of the PA (i.e. the institutional basis of this quasi-state) makes this, at best, a 
long-term perspective.
103 
Even though it is legally indisputable,
104 the right of return of the Palestinian refugees poses 
genuine problems that cannot be ignored. First of all, a return of all diaspora Palestinians 
might well overtax the absorption capacity of Palestinian society. The Gaza strip is already 
one of the world’s most densely populated areas, and the West Bank can only accommodate a 
limited number of immigrants – even if Jewish settlers were to be evicted. Secondly, a large 
influx of immigrants would place great strains on the natural resources of the land, not least 
its scarce water supplies.
105 
Thirdly, one might question (and a large portion of the Israelis undoubtedly would) the ethics, 
if not the legality, of evicting young Jewish settlers to make room for returning Palestinians. 
In some cases, the former may have been born in the settlement, while the latter may never 
have set foot there. To thus create a “moral fait accompli” has, of course, all along been part 
of the Israeli rationale for the settlements, hence a very strong argument for putting a stop to 
the settlement drive. Once the settlers have been there for more than a generation, however, 
they do have a moral case to make. 
What might help would be a degree of reciprocity. It is adding insult to injury when the Israeli 
government denies the right of return for Palestinians while upholding the “right” of all Jews 
to immigrate to Israel, regardless of whether they have any real personal links to the country 
and even if they reside in countries where they are just as safe as everybody else. For Israel to 
abrogate this law would not merely relieve the demographic pressure, but might also have a 
significant psychological impact, by signalling that the two nations regard each other as 
equals. A link between Jewish and Palestinian immigration (including return) quotas would 
turn the present zero-sum into a collaborative “game”. The more Jews the Israeli authorities 
would want to attract the more Palestinians would they have to allow, and vice versa. In view 
of the different living conditions of diaspora Jews and Palestinians, however, the proportions 
would have to be skewed in favour of Palestinians, say in a 1:3 ratio.  
Mutual recognition such as implied by the above is also an indispensable element of societal 
security for the Palestinian nation and for its development of a sense of national identity that 
is not a “victim identity” (like that of the Jews after the Holocaust). However, it probably has 
to be accompanied by economic and social measures that will allow the Palestinians to be the 
actual equals of the Jews, which takes us to the realm of human security. 
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6.3  Human Security 
The Palestinians are clearly victims of “structural violence” (see above), which arguably 
constitutes a threat to their human security. An abolition of the “apartheid system” that has 
developed for the occupied territories
106 is thus indispensable, but there may also be a need 
for foreign assistance to accelerate the indispensable “levelling of the playing field”, entailing 
an evening out of living standards, levels of education, etc. between the two nations. By 
benefiting the Palestinians, this would tend to facilitate Palestinian state-building and further 
democratisation – including the growth of civil society – thereby also help allay Israeli 
security concerns.
107 
An amelioration of the structural violence to which the Palestinians are subjected would 
presumably make them less prone to direct violence, which could in turn limit the 
“retaliatory” Israeli direct violence. The general reduction of violence could allow both sides 
to interact more freely, thereby dismantling enemy images and mitigating the “societal 
security dilemma”. Both a bi-national solution to the state problem and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state would come to be seen as less threatening to the Israeli population. If Israel 
would no longer fear “the enemy within” they could find that they have a wider margin for 
“concessions” such as a withdrawal from occupied territories, thereby paving the way for a 
comprehensive peace with the Arab world as a whole. 
Just as Palestinian terrorism is a threat to the individual security of the Jews, the presence of 
armed settlers and security forces in the midst of Palestinian society is a threat to the 
individual security of the Palestinians – to say nothing of the threat posed by terrorist 
extremists such as Baruch Goldstein, or the reprisals by Israeli security forces against 
Palestinian civilians. A minimum security requirement is a disarming of all non-state forces: 
Jewish settlers as well as Palestinian civilians and paramilitary militias. As all other “modern” 
and civilised societies, Palestinian society will be better off with its state enjoying a 
“monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” within its territory.
108  
The key to a solution to these human security problems may be economic improvement, 
which in turn presupposes a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, of which a settlement with the 
Palestinians would be an indispensable part. External actors can help, e.g. by providing 
economic assistance to the Palestinian authorities and population as a means of peace 
building.
109 According to an optimistic analysis this could set in motion a benign cycle as an 
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alternative to the vicious one in which both sides are presently entrapped. 
7  Towards a Settlement 
Even though Israeli and Palestinian security concerns remain far apart, the above analysis has, 
hopefully, shown that there is some scope for compromise. For both sides to the conflict, 
meaningful minimum-security requirements can be identified which are mutually compatible. 
7.1  Contours of an Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Translated into “permanent status negotiations” terminology, the issues and their possible 
resolution might be summarised as in Table 8.
110 
However attractive such an arrangement may appear, it needs some underpinning for it to 
stand even a remote change of ever being realised. 
•  First of all, it has to contain assurances that this settlement will indeed be final, in the 
sense that both sides solemnly and credibly renounce their right to ever come up with 
additional demands. 
•  Secondly, it must contain safeguards and mechanisms to ensure compliance with all its 
stipulations – including clauses about what to do in case of suspected or actual non-
compliance. Otherwise the risk is significant that one side will simply shout “foul play” 
and abrogate the agreement, taking everybody “back to square one”.  
•  Thirdly, it presupposes a favourable environment, where the other Arab states are willing 
to diplomatically recognise and peacefully coexist with Israel.  
As rightly pointed out by the International Crisis Group, the arrangement thus needs some 
international underpinning, both formally and materially. Formally, there must be an authority 
over and above the two sovereign states to arbitrate between them. Materially, that authority 
must have the means to enforce its will over those of the contestants. 
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Table 8: Permanent Status for Israel and Palestine: Main Elements  
State-
hood 
1.  A sovereign Palestinian state is established on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem with its capital in Jerusalem (Al Quds). It is recognised by Israel and the rest of the 
world. 
2.  The Palestinians and the Arab states recognise Israel. 
Borders 
and 
territory 
3.  The territory of Palestine comprises the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem within 
the borders prior to the 1967 war. 
4.  Negotiations are undertaken about adjustments of these borders through equitable “land 
swaps”.
111 
5.  An internationalised corridor is established between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
Settle-
ments 
6.  Israeli settlements on territory returned to Palestine are vacated intact with all infrastructure 
and fixtures, which become the property of Palestine. 
7.  Individual Israeli settlers who have resided on occupied territory for more than ten years, or 
who have married into Palestinian families, have the right to stay, are granted Palestinian 
citizenship and provided with suitable accommodation by the Palestinian state. 
Jeru-
salem 
8.  Sovereignty over Jerusalem resides with neither Israel nor Palestine, but with the UN, which 
establishes an ecumenical council to administer religious matters, including access to the 
various holy sites.  
9.  Municipal authorities for East and West Jerusalem are in charge of practicalities such as 
infrastructure, taxation, etc. They are elected democratically by all inhabitants of each part of 
the city, and establish a council to take care of matters of shared concern. 
10.  Both Israel and Palestine are allowed to proclaim their respective part of Jerusalem their 
capital and to establish government offices there. 
Refugees  11.  The right of return for all Palestinian refugees is acknowledged, as is the right of Jews to 
immigrate to Israel—but actual immigration permits are administered by a joint commission 
in accordance with a quota system to be agreed upon. 
12.  Palestinian refugees are given a choice between repatriation and compensation combined with 
citizenship in their respective countries of residence or third countries.  
13.  Israel is granted a veto over the repatriation of Palestinian refugees to Israel, therein-included 
territories acquired through negotiated land swaps. 
Security 
arrange-
ments 
14.  Palestine constitutionally commits itself to armed neutrality. 
15.  It commits itself constitutionally to field only such military forces as are required for the 
defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
16.  It commits itself to immediately disarm all non-state forces on its territory and henceforth to 
prevent its territory from being used by terrorist groups for attacks against Israel. 
 
7.2  The Regional Setting: Arab-Israeli Peace 
Unless its regional environment remains peaceful, Israel does indeed have a security problem, 
which might warrant such extraordinary measures as could upset any deal with the 
Palestinians. It is, of course, conceivable that “the international community” (including the 
United States as the unchallenged military superpower) could throw its weight into the 
conflict to preserve the Israeli-Palestinian arrangement against regional “spoilers”, but 
unlikely that it would continue be ready for this indefinitely. Hence the need to embed the 
Israeli-Palestinian arrangement in a more comprehensive regional setting, which would have 
to include the following elements. 
Syria remains an indispensable party to any lasting peace, if only because of its support for 
the radical Palestinians and its central role in Lebanon. A precondition for an Israeli-Syrian 
peace is, of course, an Israeli withdrawal from the (illegally) occupied Golan Heights,
112 but 
this raises at least two problems.  
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First of all, any party in a position to deploy missiles, long-range artillery or other offensive-
capable armed forces on the heights will constitute a threat to the respective other. Hence the 
need for a demilitarisation (or, at least, a prohibition of the stationing of certain types of 
weaponry such as long-range artillery) combined with an international military presence on 
the Heights. this could be combined with early warning facilities, the data from should be 
accessible to both sides.
113 Secondly, a mutually acceptable solution to the water problem 
would have to be found, e.g. by an Israeli lease from Syria of the contested shoreline of Lake 
Tiberias or, even better, an agreement on joint management of the water problem. In order to 
facilitate the reaca cohing of a compromise Israel might even “play the Turkish card” by 
seeking to persuade Turkey to ensure Syria sufficient water supplies from the Euphrates-
Tigris riveraine system.
114 
It will surely help if Syria proceeds with the liberalisation or even democratisation process 
which has apparently been set in motion after the death of Asad senior
115 – but it would be 
unwise to make this a precondition for a peace agreement. 
Lebanon is, likewise, a potential problem, not so much because of strength as of weakness.  
A Lebanese state which disintegrates as it did in the past
116 will either make Syria feel that it 
needs to maintain its military presence in Lebanon, or it will leave the country wide open for 
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use by Palestinian forces defiant of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement – or it will 
provoke an Israeli re-occupation of (southern or all of) Lebanon. A precondition for internal 
peace in Lebanon would seem to be a demobilisation of all militias, including the Hizbullah, 
which again makes Syria a central player, along with its quasi-ally Iran, both of whom are 
supporting it. Upon disarmament, however, Syria should be obliged to withdraw its military 
presence.
117 
The Israeli peace with Jordan should be strengthened further, e.g. in order to protect it 
against any unfavourable internal developments, such as a toppling of the Hashemite regime, 
e.g. by islamists Palestinians.
 118 This would inevitably have reverberations in Palestine and 
might well upset an Israeli-Palestinian peace. A precondition for strengthening the Jordanian 
State might be a repatriation of a large part of the Palestinian refugees to Palestine combined 
with full citizenship and integration to those who prefer to remain in Jordan – which might, in 
its turn, call for some international economic support.  
As the leading Arab state Egypt is also a central piece of the puzzle. Unfortunately its peace 
with Israel remains distinctly cold, and it strains the imagination to conceive of a “warm” 
peace between the two countries in the absence of a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian 
problem. The regime in Egypt has continuously been challenged by islamist forces, which 
would undoubtedly be strengthened if Egypt were to abandon its (mainly rhetorical) support 
for the Palestinian cause.
119 An Islamist Egypt would definitely represent a threat to the entire 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.   
7.3  A “Fertile Crescent Community” 
All of the above regional factors are interlinked, and problems in one bilateral relationship 
could all too easily spill over into others. Hence the need for a multilateral settlement. One 
might, for instance, want to think about the prospects of a “Chinese boxes” arrangement, 
where the future Palestine and Jordan establish a confederation (perhaps even federation)
120 
which then, in the fullness of time, merges with Israel into a looser confederation.
121 
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This entails a certain division of powers between confederate, federate, state, local and 
perhaps regional political authorities. At which level the supreme authority should reside 
would differ from one issue-area to the next, preferably according to the principles of 
“subsidiarity”. This would mean a combination of centralisation and decentralisation that 
would allow decisions to be taken as locally as possible, but as high up in the hierarchy as 
necessary. Some authority, e.g. over religious matters, might even be divided functionally 
(between the different religious groups within the total territory) as opposed to territorially, as 
in a consociational democracy.
122 
In such a confederate structure of the future, borders would surely gradually become less 
important. Eventually, they would become internal, administrative borders, rather than 
dividing lines between sovereign political entities. Hence, they would be less likely to provide 
a possible casus belli. They could, furthermore, gradually become “softer” and more 
permeable, thus allowing for a freer flow of labour, goods and capital, thereby allowing for 
synergies and economies of scale that would promise medium to long-term benefits for all 
involved. 
The suggested scheme also offers a possible solution to the thorny, but inescapable, question 
of Jerusalem/Al-Quds. Within the larger political framework of the future, and with both the 
Israeli and Palestinian political authorities “demoted” from sovereign to more administrative 
units, it would be less of a problem to envision the city serving as a dual, or even triple, 
capital. It could be the capital, and host the government of, both Israel and Palestine, just as it 
might be the home of the confederal authorities – just like Brussels is both the capital of 
Belgium and the centre of the European Union. Religious matters, such as the maintenance of, 
and regulation of access to, the holy sites, could be handled by an ecumenical authority, while 
each half of the city could have its own (half-) city councils in charge of local administrative 
matters, albeit with an “umbrella” of a joint council to oversee matters pertaining to the city 
as a whole.
123  
The resultant confederation might, in the even more distant future, become a constituent part 
of an even larger (but inevitably also even looser) political entity, including Lebanon and/or 
Syria, i.e. some kind of  “Fertile Crescent Community”.
124 In the fullness of time other states 
adjacent to this community might become associated with it – just as regional organisations in 
other parts of the world (e.g. ASEAN in Southeast Asia) have widened, in some cases even to 
embrace former enemies.
125 
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It would, for instance, by important to tie countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia to it, all of which have important stakes in the Levant. Turkey by virtue of its 
sharing of water resources with Iraq and Syria and its quasi-alliance with Israel as well as, 
perhaps even more importantly, its potential role as a bridge between the Levant and 
Europe;
126 Egypt because of its former control of the Gaza strip, its shared border with Israel 
and its leadership role in the Arab world; Iran by virtue of its alliance with Syria and its status 
as a major military power;
127 Iraq because of its shared borders with Jordan and Syria and its 
future status as a major Arab military power, once the sanctions are lifted; and Saudi Arabia 
because of its central religious role for all of Islam as well as its formidable economic power.  
It would, however, be important that this piecemeal association does not occur so fast as to 
sacrifice deepening for the sake of widening. One might, for instance, envision a process with 
the following steps, alternating between deepening and widening, and probably lasting for 
several decades – the timing mainly intended for illustrative purposes. 
 
2005  Palestinian statehood (under international supervision or trusteeship) 
2007  A Palestinian-Jordanian loose confederation, including foreign policy (deepening) 
2010  An association agreement between the confederation and Israel (widening) 
2012  Full confederation between Israel and Palestine/Jordan (deepening) 
2014 Association  agreements  with Lebanon and Syria (widening) 
2018  Full confederation with Lebanon and Syria (deepening) 
2019  Association agreements with Turkey, Egypt, (post-Saddam Hussein) Iraq, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia (widening) 
2022  Formation of a “Fertile Crescent Community” (deepening) 
 
The resultant community would hold a lot of promise for all involved, not “merely” in terms 
of conflict prevention and peace, but also economically.
128 The starting point for such a 
process, however, has to be the granting of sovereignty to Palestine, as this is a precondition 
for entering into such binding agreements. On the other hand, non-binding declarations of 
intent on the part of the present PA might make the prospects of Palestinian statehood more 
palatable for Israel – and some kind of international supervision might make such declarations 
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more credible. As shall be elaborated upon below, the international community, and 
especially the EU, may also facilitate the process.  
7.4  The International Setting 
As rightly emphasised by the ICG and others, the international setting matters, both for better 
and worse. 
•  External actors may block the achievement of an Israeli-Palestinian or a more 
comprehensive regional peace, e.g. by upsetting an already fragile semi-stability by 
launching a war such as the planned one against Iraq; or their promises of support may 
give the parties unrealistic expectations of the prospects of victory; or they may provide 
unconditional support to one side, thereby removing its need for such a compromise as 
would be the only realistic solution to the conflict, as argued above. 
•  External actors may facilitate an agreement, e.g. by putting pressure (by means of 
sanctions or otherwise) on the parties to reach a settlement; or by promising rewards for 
such a solution (e.g. in the form of economic support);
129 or by serving as mediators 
between the conflicting sides, i.e. as “honest brokers”;
130 or by providing safeguards for 
each side against the respective other’s non-compliance with the agreement. 
The most relevant external actors in this respect are surely the United Nations, the USA and 
“Europe”, particularly the European Union, as in the aforementioned Quartet, to which Russia 
may seem to be a party more for its own sake than for that of the Middle East. 
For some reason, a consensus seems to have emerged, even within the Quartet, that the United 
States should play the leading role – a position also adopted by the ICG. The wisdom in thus 
continuing to acquiesce to a US “leadership“ which has yet to produce any results seems 
questionable. It is neither self-evident that the United States can, nor that it is even willing to 
help bring about a solution to the conflict. It may be the only power with a sufficient weight 
to make an impact on the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but experience seems to 
show that not even the US is able to persuade Israel to change its policies, e.g. with regard to 
settlements. 
The United States has all along been far from impartial, but a staunch supporter of Israel, not 
least because of ideological affinity.
131 As the region’s main military power, Israel will also 
continue to play an important strategic role for the United States – even in a future war 
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131 On the general support for Israel see Lipson, Charles: “American Support for Israel: History, Sources, 
Limits”, in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.): U.S.-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads (Newbury Park: Frank Cass, 1997), 
pp. 128-146. On the role of the Jewish lobby and religious groups see Hertzberg, Arthur: “Israel and the 
Diaspora: A Relationship Reexamined”, ibid., pp. 168-183; Wald, Kenneth D. & al.: “Reclaiming Zion: How 
American Religious Groups View the Middle East”, ibid., pp. 147-167; Reich, Bernard: “Reassessing the US-
Israeli Special Relationship”, in Karsh (ed.): op. cit. (note 6), pp.pp. 64-83.   B JØRN MØLLER 
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against Iraq for which Israel has pledged its support.
132 Conversely, the United States is bound 
to remain Israel’s main ally, if only because of its role as the main supplier of arms (on very 
favourable terms), providing $208 of $289 billion (constant 1990 dollars), i.e. 72 percent in 
the period 1996 to 2000.
133 In both cases, the strength of the relationship is directly 
proportional to the region’s conflict-proneness. 
Hence Washington may neither be able, nor even have the will to enforce a compromise 
settlement – and it is even less likely than before to do so under the present Bush 
administration.
134 On the other hand, it is clear that nobody else can enforce an agreement that 
the United States does not support, much less one that it directly opposes. Hence the role of 
Washington may be more appropriately described as that of a potential ”spoiler”. The 
conclusion remains the same, i.e. that the USA must be part of any solution, albeit mainly 
because it is already part of the problem.  
8   A Possible Role for Europe 
There is thus an urgent need for someone to play the leading role for which the United States 
does not qualify. It is the contention of this paper that “Europe”, and particularly the EU, 
might play such as role, if only it decides to give it a try. For this to happen, four things are 
required: leverage, instruments, will and sound policies.  
8.1  The Leverage of the EU 
One of the vehicles for an EU policy in the 
Middle East in general, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in particular, is the so-
called “Barcelona process”, encompassing the 
EU and countries of the Maghreb and the 
Levant, including both Israel and Palestine 
(see map). 
It was initiated with the Barcelona Declaration 
(27-28 November 1995)
135 which for-mulated 
the common objective of  “a just, com-
prehensive and lasting peace settlement in the 
Middle East based on the relevant United 
                                                 
132 See Israelline, 15 August 2002, quoting PM Sharon as saying that “the U.S. and Israel are coordinating the 
planned U.S. offensive against Iraq ”.  
133 Hagelin, Björn & al.: “Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001, p. 326; On the 
arms relationship see Neff, Donald: Fallen Pillars. U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 167-182. On the background see Pierre, Andrew J.: The Global Politics of Arms 
Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 156-164.  On the general strategic relationship see 
Rothstein, Robert L.: “Israel, the United States, and the World Order Crisis: Fuzzy Logic and Conflicting 
Principles”, in Sheffer (ed.): op. cit. (note 135), pp. 76-93; Luttwak, Edward N.: “Strategic Aspects of U.S.-
Israeli Relations”, ibid., pp. 198-211. 
134 For a very severe (and probably exaggerated) critique of the U.S. bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see 
Chomsky, Noam: Fateful  Triangle. The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, 2
nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 
1999) 
135 “The Barcelona Declaration”, in Richard Gillespie (ed.): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and 
Economic Perspectives (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.177-187. On the process see also Gillespie, Richard: 
“Introduction: The Europe-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative”, ibid., pp. 1-11; Calabrese, John: “Beyond 
Barcelona: The Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, European Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), 
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Nations Security Council resolutions” and the even loftier goal of  “turning the Mediterranean 
basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and 
prosperity”. On the other hand, the EU also pledged to “refrain, in accordance with the rules 
of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another 
partner”, thereby to some extent tying its own hands with regard to impacting on such 
“internal affairs” as might jeopardise regional stability. 
Alternatively, this pledge might be seen as reflecting the “indirect approach” to security 
which has arguably characterised the “European project” since its very inception. Ever since 
the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), via the Rome Treaty and the 
EEC (European Economic Community) to the present European Union, this organisation has 
focused on “soft security” – i e. security based on a removal of motives for aggression, mostly by 
non-military means, rather than on a defence by military means against an aggression in 
progress. The underlying philosophy was made explicit in the 1952 Schuman Declaration: 
136 
The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-
old opposition of France and Germany. (...) The pooling of coal and steel 
production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations 
for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe (...). The 
solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between 
France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.  
The Barcelona process is, likewise, based on the presumed link between interdependence and 
peace,
137 which would presumably be furthered by the “zone of shared prosperity” envisaged 
in the Barcelona declaration to be based on a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. However 
utopian it may seem the Fertile Crescent Community envisioned above would be tantamount 
to such a shared prosperity zone. 
The notion of  “dialogue among civilisations” falls in the same category of soft measures, and 
might in fact be seen as a continuation of the the general policy of detente during the Cold 
War and, in particular, the Ostpolitik of Germany under the heading “Wandel durch 
Annäherung” (i.e. “change through rapprochement”).
138 It might also be seen as a counter to 
the thesis of a future “clash of civilisations” promulgated by Samuel Huntington.
139 To the 
end of civilisational dialogue the declaration foresaw, inter alia, meetings between 
                                                 
136 Schuman, Robert: “The Schuman Declaration”, in Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.): The 
European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1994 ), pp. 11-12. See also Mitrany, David: “A Working Peace System”, ibid., pp. 77-97. 
137 On interdependence theory see Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence. World 
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Wilde, Jaap de: Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence 
Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex 
Interdependence (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991). 
138 See, for instance, Bahr, Egon (1963): “Wandel durch Annäherung”, in idem: Sicherheit für and vor Deutsch-
land. Vom Wandel durch Annäherung zur Europäischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft (München: Carl Hanser, 1991),  
pp. 11-17; Ehmke, Horst, Karlheinz Koppe & Herbert Wehner (eds.): Zwanzig Jahre Ostpolitik. Bilanz und Per-
spektiven (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1986); Griffith, William E.: The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); Bender, Peter: Neue Ostpolitik. Vom Mauerbau bis zum 
Moskauer Vertrag (München: dtv, 1986). 
139 Huntington, Samuel P.: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996). See also Fuller, Graham E;  Lessler, Ian O.: A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the 
West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995); Halliday, Fred: Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1996); Hunter, Shireen T: The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence 
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representatives of the different religions and other concrete initiates such as periodic meetings 
between parliamentarians.  
An integral part of the Barcelona process is the MEDA programme, under the auspices of 
which the EU disburses grant and loans to the partner countries, both bilaterally (86 percent in 
the period 1995-1999) and to regional collaboration (twelve percent).
140 MEDA and the entire 
Barcelona process are now in their second phase, yet seemingly without any major changes in 
orientation.
141 The main component remains development aid, for which the PA is eligible, 
but Israel not, because of its high level of economic development. 
There is no doubt that the substantial support granted to the PA, both by the EU as such and 
by individual member, countries provides Europe with considerable leverage over the 
Palestinian authorities.
142 The EU is the main provider of aid, committing from 1994 to 1999 
a total of €731.1 million.
143 The EU has further provided special assistance to the PA 
institutions, including training for the security forces.  
In response to the Israeli attacks on the PA institutions (including facilities financed by the 
EU), the EU further pledged supplementary assistance for their reconstruction.
144 While it has 
come under pressure from Israel and the United States to withdraw this support – because of 
allegations that some of it has been diverted to terrorist activities – the EU has (so far) 
remained steadfast in wanting to maintain its assistance,
145 and it has even provided 
emergency humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered Palestinians.
146 To this assistance 
should be added the bilateral aid granted by individual EU member states and the multilateral 
aid which most of them are providing via the UN’s various affiliates such as UNRWA.  
Even though most of the Palestinian trade with the EU still goes via Israel, a free-trade 
agreement (signed in 1997) has been in force since 2001.
147 Once Israel removes the present 
trade impediments and the Palestinian economy is reconstructed, the free trade agreement 
holds considerable promise for the Palestinian. The EU thus has considerable leverage over 
the Palestinians. 
                                                 
140 Figures from “The MEDA Programme”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm. 
141 “From MEDA I to MEDA II: What’s New?”, EUROMED Special Feature, no. 21 (3 May 2001), at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/special_feature21_en.pdf .See also “Regional 
Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004”,  at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
external_relations/euromed/rsp/rsp02_06.pdf; chapter 4 of the report The European Community External 
Cooperation Programs. Policies, Management & Distribution" at http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/ 
evaluation/odi_report_en/chap4.pdf; and the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament.  Annual Report of the MEDA Programme 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/reports/ 
meda_2000_en.pdf. 
142 Brynen: op. cit. (note 114), pp. 91-.94 & passim. EU aid to the PA is described in “The EU’s Relations with 
West Bank and Gaza Strip”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro/index.htm. See also  
143 Figures from ibid. 
144 “Commission decides on emergency rehabilitation of administrative infrastructure of Palestinian Authority” 
(27 June 2002), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/news/ip02_947.htm. 
145 See “European Parliament Committees vote in favour of continued EU aid to Palestinian Authority” (20 June 
2002),  at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/news/ip02_906.htm.  
146 See “Commission provides further EUR 3.5 million in emergency humanitarian aid for the Palestinian 
Territories”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gaza/news/ip02_690.htm. 
147 “Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community, on 
the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the 
West Bank and Gaze Strip, of the other part”, Official Journal L187 (16 July 1997), pp. 3-135. A COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
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Its leverage over Israel has little to do with aid (for which Israel does not qualify) and more 
with trade relations. To the extent that it is able and willing to collaborate with other MEDA 
countries, however, Israel is also eligible for its share of funds set aside for regional 
collaboration.
148 More importantly, however, Israel has an association agreement with the EU, 
signed in 1995 (replacing a precursor from 1975) and in force since 2000.
149 Partly as a result 
of this, the EU is Israel’s main trading partner, standing for about 27 percent of Israel’s 
exports and 35 percent of its imports (see Table 8).  
Table 8. Israel’s Trade (mil. ECU/Euro) 
Imports from:  1980 1990 2000 Exports to: 1980 1990 2000
World 6,956 12,044 39,917 World  3,984 9,427 34,612
EU 1,813 5,456 13,978 EU  1,777 3,626 9,351
EU share  26.1% 45.3% 35.0% EU Share  44.6% 38.5% 27.0%
  Source: Figures from http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/bilstat/econo_israel.xls. 
 
In comparison, the US figures are forty percent for exports to Israel and twenty percent for 
imports from Israel (see Table 9). This trade dependency of Israel on the EU might be 
instrumentalised by being made conditional on satisfactory Israeli performance vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians. Suggestions have also been made for a modification of the Association 
Agreement enjoyed by Israel to ensure that they do not apply to commodities produced on 
occupied ground, thereby barring access for the produce of Israeli  settlements from the West 
Bank, Gaza and Golan. 
The EU also has other, less concrete, instruments at its disposal for exerting influence on 
Israel. The Jewish state has an obvious interest in portraying itself (and not without some 
justification) as a semi-European  “island of modernity” in a sea of premodern orientalism. 
Even though this interest may not be equally strong will all segments of the Israeli population, 
all share the desire to be acknowledged as the bastion of western values. 
This might be instrumentalised by the EU, e.g. by making the acknowledgement of Israel’s 
“European credentials” conditional on conformity with the standards of ”civilised behaviour” 
in its treatment of the Palestinians. Holding up the prospects of an EU membership at some 
point in the future might be an even stronger instrument which might induce “anticipatory 
adaptation” to European standards
150 – as seems to have been the case of Turkey’s recent 
reform package and the subsequent lifting of the death sentence on PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan.
151  
The EU thus has the potential for exerting considerable influence on both parties to the 
conflict, albeit mainly by “soft” means. Unfortunately, however, the impact thereof is likely 
                                                 
148 An authoritative overview is “The EU’s Relations with Israel”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/israel/intro/index.htm. 
149 Described in http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel/intro/index.htm. See also “EC Regional 
Trade Agreements”, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/ ecrtagr.pdf. 
150 This term was coined (for Eastern Europe) by Stephan Haggard, Marc A. Levy, Andrew Moravcsik and 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis in their “Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargainingm and 
Institutions”, in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye  Stanley Hoffman (eds.): After the Cold War. International 
Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 
173-195.  
151 See “Parliament begins debate on EU reforms”, Turkish Daily News (Electronic Edition), 2 August 2002, at 
www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_02_02/dom.htm. On the Öcalan sentence see International Herald 
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to be less significant, the more both sides are in “a security mode”, i.e. the more all other 
considerations are set aside for the sake of national or societal security. To the extent that they 
see their very survival as states and/or nations to be endangered, both Israel and the 
Palestinians are quite prepared to endure hardships. 
Potentials such as the above may thus, at best, be instrumentalised as contributions to the 
aforementioned “moment of ripeness”, e.g. by making the stalemate look intolerable, as well 
as to make the possible (post-conflict) future look bright enough for both sides to be willing to 
take some risks. 
Table 9: Israel’s Foreign Trade
152 (US$ mil.) 
Exports to 
Year  US Rest Am. EU Rest Eur. Africa Asia Oceania World US  EU  Others
1991 3,602 386 4,405 527 186 1,753 121 10,980  33% 40% 27%
1992 4,008 405 4,681 575 229 2,049 143 12,089  33% 39% 28%
1993 4,622 500 4,538 974 264 2,512 159 13,569  34% 33% 32%
1994 5,277 638 4,966 1,047 284 3,185 215 15,611  34% 32% 34%
1995 5,736 676 6,153 1,306 354 3,825 248 18,297  31% 34% 35%
1996 6,303 753 6,594 1,391 389 4,131 239 19,799  32% 33% 35%
1997 7,257 947 6,788 1,632 477 4,196 279 21,576  34% 31% 35%
1998 7,936 1,074 7,091 1,549 479 3,242 272 21,642  37% 33% 31%
1999 8,750 1,026 7,561 1,484 470 4,109 331 23,731  37% 32% 31%
2000 11,734 1,200 8,563 1,866 546 5,817 245 29,970  39% 29% 32%
2001 11,112 1,373 7,636 1,643 458 5,245 264 27,730  40% 28% 32%
Imports from 
Year  US Rest. Am. EU Rest Eur. Africa Asia Oceania World US EU Others
1991 3,261 366 8,411 1,712 300 1,360 48 15,459  21% 54% 24%
1992 3,234 332 9,832 1,642 332 1,612 56 17,041  19% 58% 23%
1993 3,643 334 10,548 1,965 298 2,043 56 18,887  19% 56% 25%
1994 4,272 425 12,719 2,182 325 2,293 63 22,279  19% 57% 24%
1995 5,259 451 14,808 2,640 414 2,835 78 26,485  20% 56% 24%
1996 5,982 465 15,483 2,535 390 3,049 91 27,994  21% 55% 23%
1997 5,445 617 14,859 2,545 388 3,134 92 27,080  20% 55% 25%
1998 5,386 696 13,335 2,634 355 3,418 114 25,937  21% 51% 28%
1999 6,317 685 14,386 3,087 363 4,088 102 29,029  22% 50% 29%
2000 6,646 678 15,466 3,469 373 5,202 149 31,983  21% 48% 31%
2001 6,705 648 13,920 3,518 429 4,697 151 30,068  22% 46% 31%
 
8.2  EU Ambitions and Instruments for Conflict Management  
There is also a need for more direct intervention into the conflict. Most of these are surely 
non-military, even though military means may conceivably also come to play a role. 
The EU impacts strongly on the economic, and thereby also social and political conditions, of 
other countries, including their propensity for violent conflict. In recognition of these 
linkages, conflict prevention and resolution considerations are increasingly being integrated 
with the general concepts of development. The EU has produced a number of documents on 
conflict management and resolution in recent years (See Table 10) which may add up to an 
actual strategy for conflict management. 
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Table 10: Recent EU Documents on Conflict Management 
1997 The  EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms 
a/ 
1998  The Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution 
b/ 
1998 The  EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export 
c/ 
1998  The European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of 
Small arms and Light Weapons 
d/ 
1999  Council Resolution on Small Arms 
e/ 
1999  Co-operation with ACP Countries Involved in Armed Conflicts 
f/ 
2001  Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development–An Assessment 
g/ 
2001  Conflict Prevention (Commission communication)
  
h/ 
2001  EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 
i/ 
2002  Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict 
j/ 
a/ http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/programconventarms.htm 
b/ http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/conclusions-1998.htm. 
c/ http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/codecondarmsexp.htm 
d/ http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/jointaction.pdf 
e/ http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/councres-smarms.htm 
f/ COM(199)240 final, http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/cm-communicat.pdf. 
g/ http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0153en01.pdf 
h/ http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf. On the implementation see 
“One Year On: the Commission’s Conflict Prevention Policy” (March 2002) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
external_relations/cpcm/cp/rep.htm. 
i/ http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF. 
j/ At http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm. 
 
The communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention of 2001 contained a long 
list of recommendations for conflict prevention. Under the heading of “long-term prevention” 
it expressed the intention to: 
(...) give higher priority to its support for regional integration and in particular 
regional organisations with a clear conflict prevention mandate; (...) ensure that 
its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly 
focused on addressing root causes of conflict in an integrated way (....) 
implement, for countries showing conflict potential, more targeted actions, where 
appropriate, to open the way to a more favourable democratic environment. (...) 
play an increasingly active role in the security sector area. This will take the form 
of activities aiming at improving police services, promoting conversion, 
disarmament and non-proliferation both as regards weapons of mass destruction 
and conventional weapons. (...) in post-conflict situations, concentrate EC 
assistance on the consolidation of peace and the prevention of future conflicts, in 
particular through rehabilitation programmes, child-related rehabilitation 
measures and DDR programmes as well as programmes supporting reconciliation 
processes. (...) give higher priority to its support aimed at controlling the spread 
of small arms.  
Under the heading of “short term prevention” it mentioned regular reviews of potential 
conflict zones, including the establishment of early warning mechanisms, the use of 
preventive sanctions, systematic use of the political dialogue where a crisis appears imminent, 
the use of special representatives for mediation and training initiatives in the fields of rule of 
law and civil administration for personnel to be deployed in international missions.
153  
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All this sounds very promising even though it remains to be seen whether the actual 
implementation will be satisfactory. If so, it could do quite a lot to help in both conflict 
prevention and post-conflict peace building. So far, however, the EU has not had the audacity 
to attempt playing the leading role as mediator or honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
Until recently, however, the EU deliberately avoided military matters, leaving the military 
aspects of security to NATO and/or the Western European Union (WEU). In connection with 
the Maastricht treaty of February 1992, however, the WEU was proclaimed to constitute an 
integral part of the EU, and in June the same year the WEU formulated its future tasks, 
henceforth known as “Petersberg tasks”, comprising peacekeeping, humanitarian operations 
and crisis management. Since then, all operational WEU activities have been taken over by 
the EU.
154 
Spearheaded by Germany, France and the UK, the EU have thus created a genuine European 
security and defence capacity, the interim goal being the capacity of fielding 60,000 troops on 
short notice for “Petersberg operations”. However, they all emphasise the need to preserve the 
transatlantic link and go out of their way to assure the US that the European ventures are 
entirely compatible with NATO.
155 Should the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at some stage call 
for an international military presence, as seems quite likely (see above), the EU will thus have 
the requisite means at its disposal for providing a substantial contribution, perhaps even for 
running the operation – just as it would have for dispatching an interpositioning force after a 
future Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. 
8.3  A European Middle East Policy 
It takes more than just leverage and instruments to make a difference in a conflict as 
complicated as that between Israel and the Palestinians. Most important of all is to have a 
policy that may work. 
                                                 
154  See the “Marsailles Declaration” passed by the WEU Council of Ministers (13 November 2000) at 
www.weu.int/.  On the background see Rees, G. Wyn: The Western European Union at the Crossroads. Between 
Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); Varwick, Johannes: 
Sicherheit und Integration in Europa. Zur Renaissance der Westeuropäischen Union (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 
Verlag, 1998); McKenzie, Mary M. & Peter H. Loedel (eds.): The Promise and Reality of European Security 
Cooperation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). 
155 The declaration of 19 June 1992 is available at www.weu.int/eng/documents.html. In its part II, 4, the 
following tasks (besides common defence) are mentioned: “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. See also Heisbourg, François: “Europe's 
Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity”, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-15; Howorth, 
Jolyon: “Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative”, ibid., pp. 33-55; Maull, Hanns W.: “Germany and 
the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?”, ibid., pp. 56-80; Howorth, Jolyon & Anand Menon: The European 
Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge, 1997); Rynning, Steen: “Providing Relief or 
Promoting Democracy? The European Union and Crisis Management”, Security Dialogue, vol. 32, no. 1 (2001), 
pp. 87-101; and Missiroli, Antonio: “CFSP, Defence and Flexibility”, Challiot Paper, no. 38 (Brussels: Institute 
for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000); Heisbourg, François & al.: “European Defence: Making it 
Work”, ibid. no. 42 (2000); Howorth, Jolyon: “European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?”, 
ibid. no. 43 (2000); Ortega, M.: “Military Intervention and the European Union”, ibid. no. 45 (2001). All the 
relevant documents are contained in in Rutten, Maartje (ed.): From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core 
Documents”, ibid. no. 47 (2001). See also Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, 
presented to the European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000, ibid., pp. 168-211. The International Crisis Group 
in June 2001 published an assessment: EU Crisis Response Initiative. Institutions and Processes for Conflict 
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The European states have, at least collectively, a more impartial attitude to the conflict than 
does the United States, albeit one resulting from different (and to some extent perhaps even 
incompatible) attitudes to the conflict.
156 France thus tends to lean towards the Arab side of 
the conflict, both because of its past as a “mandate power” and as a reflection of its rivalry 
with the US, whereas Germany is almost certain to be on the side of Israel, at least as far as 
“existential” issues are concerned, lest it be accused of a resurgent anti-semitism.
157 The UK 
has tended to be more pro-Israeli than the French, if only because of its “special relationship” 
with Washington; whereas the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) have a long 
history of equidistance, having all supported Israel in existential matters while at the same 
time taking the legitimate demands of the Palestinians seriously.
158 
That the sum of European policies is thus more impartial and even-handed because of the 
divergence of policies, however, does not easily translate into a unified impartialily, and the 
European Union has, indeed, found it difficult to agree on a concrete Middle Eastern policy – 
apart from the general support for the two-state solution and proposals for a peace conference 
(see above). On the other hand, the European countries are, in a certain sense, neighbours to 
the Middle East, separated (or united) by the Mediterranean, which may even have the 
potential of becoming a fully-fledged region.
159 Hence, they have strong interests in the 
region and its stability. 
However, the EU is not “the only game in town”, but most of its member states are also 
members of NATO (which also has a “Mediterranean dialogue” process)
160, hence may have 
conflicting loyalties.
161 On the other hand, this may also provide the EU with some indirect 
leverage as the main allies of the United States. If anybody can persuade Washington to 
change course, it is undoubtedly its European friends and allies. 
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8.4  Recommendations 
What the EU might do includes the measures listed in Table 11, subdivided according to the 
“setting” upon which they are supposed to impact and their time perspective.  
All of the above calls for the EU to take the lead. Needless to say, the EU should seek to 
involve the United States as much as possible, but it would be unwise to make US active 
participation a precondition for moving ahead.  
Table 11. What the EU Might Do 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict  The Regional Setting 
Immediate Measures 
•  Put pressure (e.g. by means of trade conditionali-
ties) on Israel to end the occupation and the re-
prisals against presumed terrorists and their 
families 
•  Put pressure (e.g. by means of aid conditiona-
lities) on the PA to prevent terrorist attacks on 
Israel 
•  Support Israeli NGOs advocating a peaceful 
solution to the conflict 
•  Support Palestinian NGOs opposing terrorism  
•  Monitor elections in Palestine and recognise 
whatever government emerges from these 
elections, if these are declared “fair and free”. 
•  Support Palestinian security sector reform, both 
financially and in the form of training 
•  Convene a conference on peace in the Levant, 
bringing together Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Jor-
dan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran–with a “parallel track for” NGOs from the 
respective countries as well as the EU  
•  Sponsor a series of seminars on matters of 
common concern both concerning “soft security” 
(e.g. tourism, water management, etc.) and “hard 
security” issues such as arms control and mili-
tary doctrines and strategies (mainly between 
Israel and Syria). 
•  Put diplomatic pressure on Syria and Iran to ter-
minate support for Hizbullah, by making this a 
precondition for preferential trade agreements  
Short-Term Measures 
•  Provide peacekeeping forces for the West Bank 
and Gaza  
•  Provide international police forces for the West 
Bank and Gaza 
•  Provide an international presence for Jerusalem, 
mainly in the form of police forces in an around 
the Old City 
•  Recognise diplomatically the “Republic of 
Palestine” upon its proclamation 
•  Provide peacekeeping forces for the Golan 
Heights in case of an Israeli-Syrian agreement 
•  Establish and maintain an early warning station 
on the Golan, preferably as a joint venture with 
the USA, providing satellite and air surveillance 
to both sides  
•  Provide troops for an international military pre-
sence in southern Lebanon, mandated, inter alia, 
to oversee the disarmament of the Hizbullah  
Medium-to-Long-Term Measures 
•  Accept temporary custodianship over Palestinian 
territories upon an Israeli withdrawal 
•  Provide economic assistance for the resettlement 
of Palestinian refugees in Palestine 
•  Grant asylum and citizenship to a stipulated 
number of Palestinian refugees 
•  Provide economic assistance for the resettlement 
of Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries  
•  Provide additional, and preferably long-term, aid 
for Palestine  
•  Offer future membership of the EU to Israel and, 
in a subsequent round, Palestine, the offer being 
made conditional upon a meeting of EU stan-
dards of democracy and human rights. 
•  Convene a conference with a view to signing a  
“Stability Pact for the Middle East”, in analogy 
with that signed for the Balkans in 1999,
162 
offering major support for reconstruction and 
institution-building, mainly for the Palestinian 
state 
•  Support regional collaboration and integration 
projects 
•  Provide leadership of a contact group to oversee 
the entire peace process and comprising, besides 
the parties themselves, the United States, the 
United Nations, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt   
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9  Conclusion 
We have thus seen that the seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict is indeed 
susceptible to rational analysis, assuming that both sides behave rationally in accordance with 
their interests as they see them. Some common ground can, indeed, be identified, i.e. it is 
possible to simultaneously satisfy the basic security needs of both sides if only both recognise 
the need for a compromise. The international setting is, likewise, quite favourable for a 
compromise solution to the conflict, the main point of which would be the establishment of a 
sovereign Palestinian state, embedded in a set of broader security arrangements. While the 
rest of the world seems to have acquiesced to a self-proclaimed US leadership, it is the 
contention of this paper that the European Union would be well-advised to take the lead as it 
is in a much better position than the United States to play the role as an honest broker and 
facilitator of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. CENTRE FOR
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